



Internet Research Task Force (IRTF)                            G. Grover
Request for Comments: 9620                                              
Updates: 8280                                               N. ten Oever
Category: Informational                          University of Amsterdam
ISSN: 2070-1721                                           September 2024


  Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol and Architecture Considerations

Abstract

   This document sets guidelines for human rights considerations for
   developers working on network protocols and architectures, similar to
   the work done on the guidelines for privacy considerations (RFC
   6973).  This is an updated version of the guidelines for human rights
   considerations in RFC 8280.

   This document is a product of the Human Right Protocol Considerations
   (HRPC) Research Group in the IRTF.

Status of This Memo

   This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
   published for informational purposes.

   This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force
   (IRTF).  The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research
   and development activities.  These results might not be suitable for
   deployment.  This RFC represents the consensus of the Human Rights
   Protocol Considerations Research Group of the Internet Research Task
   Force (IRTF).  Documents approved for publication by the IRSG are not
   candidates for any level of Internet Standard; see Section 2 of RFC
   7841.

   Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
   and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
   https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9620.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
   document authors.  All rights reserved.

   This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
   Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
   (https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info) in effect on the date of
   publication of this document.  Please review these documents
   carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
   to this document.

Table of Contents

   1.  Introduction
   2.  Human Rights Threats
   3.  Conducting Human Rights Reviews
     3.1.  Analyzing Internet-Drafts Based on Guidelines for Human
           Rights Considerations Model
     3.2.  Analyzing Internet-Drafts Based on Their Perceived or
           Speculated Impact
     3.3.  Expert Interviews
     3.4.  Interviews with Impacted Persons and Communities
     3.5.  Tracing Impacts of Implementations
   4.  Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations
     4.1.  Intermediaries
     4.2.  Connectivity
     4.3.  Reliability
     4.4.  Content Signals
     4.5.  Internationalization
     4.6.  Localization
     4.7.  Open Standards
     4.8.  Heterogeneity Support
     4.9.  Adaptability
     4.10. Integrity
     4.11. Authenticity
     4.12. Confidentiality
     4.13. Security
     4.14. Privacy
     4.15. Anonymity and Pseudonymity
       4.15.1.  Pseudonymity
       4.15.2.  Unlinkability
     4.16. Censorship Resistance
     4.17. Outcome Transparency
     4.18. Accessibility
     4.19. Decentralization
     4.20. Remedy
     4.21. Miscellaneous Considerations
   5.  Document Status
   6.  Security Considerations
   7.  IANA Considerations
   8.  Research Group Information
   9.  Informative References
   Acknowledgements
   Authors' Addresses

1.  Introduction

   This document outlines a set of human rights protocol considerations
   for protocol developers.  It provides questions that engineers should
   ask themselves when developing or improving protocols if they want to
   understand how their decisions can potentially influence the exercise
   of human rights on the Internet.  It should be noted that the impact
   of a protocol cannot solely be deduced from its design, but its usage
   and implementation should also be studied to form a full human rights
   impact assessment.

   The questions are based on the research performed by the Human Rights
   Protocol Considerations (HRPC) Research Group, which has been
   documented before these considerations.  The research establishes
   that human rights relate to standards and protocols and offers a
   common vocabulary of technical concepts that influence human rights
   and how these technical concepts can be combined to ensure that the
   Internet remains an enabling environment for human rights.  With
   this, the contours of a model for developing human rights protocol
   considerations has taken shape.

   This document is an iteration of the guidelines that can be found in
   [RFC8280].  The methods for conducting human rights reviews
   (Section 3.2) and the guidelines for human rights considerations
   (Section 3.3) in this document are being tested for relevance,
   accuracy, and validity [HR-RT].  The understanding of what human
   rights are is based on the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights"
   [UDHR] and subsequent treaties that jointly form the body of
   international human rights law [UNHR].

   This document does not provide a detailed taxonomy of the nature of
   (potential) human rights violations, whether direct or indirect /
   long-term or short-term, that certain protocol choices might present.
   In part, it is because this is highly context-dependent and also
   because this document aims to provide a practical set of guidelines.
   However, further research in this field would definitely benefit
   developers and implementers.

   This informational document has consensus for publication from the
   Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Human Right Protocol
   Considerations (HRPC) Research Group.  It has been reviewed, tried,
   and tested by both the research group as well as researchers and
   practitioners from outside the research group.  The research group
   acknowledges that the understanding of the impact of Internet
   protocols and architecture on society is a developing practice and is
   a body of research that is still ongoing.  This document is not an
   IETF product and is not a standard.

2.  Human Rights Threats

   Threats to the exercise of human rights on the Internet come in many
   forms.  Protocols and standards may harm or enable the right to
   freedom of expression; right to freedom of information; right to non-
   discrimination; right to equal protection; right to participate in
   cultural life, arts, and science; right to freedom of assembly and
   association; right to privacy; and right to security.  An end user
   who is denied access to certain services or content may be unable to
   disclose vital information about the malpractices of a government or
   other authority.  A person whose communications are monitored may be
   prevented or dissuaded from exercising their right to freedom of
   association or participate in political processes [Penney].  In a
   worst-case scenario, protocols that leak information can lead to
   physical danger.  A realistic example to consider is when individuals
   perceived as threats to the state are subjected to torture, extra-
   judicial killing, or detention on the basis of information gathered
   by state agencies through the monitoring of network traffic.

   This document presents several examples of how threats to human
   rights materialize on the Internet.  This threat modeling is inspired
   by "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols" [RFC6973], which
   is based on security threat analysis.  This method is a work in
   progress and by no means a perfect solution for assessing human
   rights risks in Internet protocols and systems.  Certain specific
   human rights threats are indirectly considered in Internet protocols
   as part of the security considerations [RFC3552]; however, privacy
   considerations [RFC6973] or reviews, let alone human rights impact
   assessments of protocols, are neither standardized nor implemented.

   Many threats, enablers, and risks are linked to different rights.
   This is not surprising if one takes into account that human rights
   are interrelated, interdependent, and indivisible.  However, here
   we're not discussing all human rights because not all human rights
   are relevant to Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in
   general and to protocols and standards in particular [Orwat]:

   |  The main source of the values of human rights is the
   |  _International Bill of Human Rights_ that is composed of the
   |  _Universal Declaration of Human Rights_ (UDHR) [UDHR] along with
   |  the _International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights_ (ICCPR)
   |  [ICCPR] and the _International Covenant on Economic, Social and
   |  Cultural Rights_ (ICESCR) [ICESCR].  In the light of several cases
   |  of Internet censorship, the UN Human Rights Council Resolution
   |  20/8 was adopted in 2012, affirming that "...the same rights that
   |  people have offline must also be protected online..." [UNHRC2016].
   |  In 2015, the _Charter of Human Rights and Principles for the
   |  Internet_ [IRP] was developed and released [Jorgensen].  According
   |  to these documents, some examples of human rights relevant for ICT
   |  systems are _human dignity_ (Art. 1 UDHR), _non-discrimination_
   |  (Art. 2), _rights to life, liberty and security_ (Art. 3),
   |  _freedom of opinion and expression_ (Art. 19), _freedom of
   |  assembly and association_ (Art. 20), _rights to equal protection,
   |  legal remedy, fair trial, due process, presumed innocent_ (Art.
   |  7-11), _appropriate social and international order_ (Art. 28),
   |  _participation in public affairs_ (Art. 21), _participation in
   |  cultural life, protection of intellectual property_ (Art. 27), and
   |  _privacy_ (Art. 12).

   A partial catalog of human rights related to ICTs, including economic
   rights, can be found in [Hill].

   This is by no means an attempt to exclude specific rights or
   prioritize some rights over others.

3.  Conducting Human Rights Reviews

   Ideally, protocol developers and collaborators should incorporate
   human rights considerations into the design process itself (see
   Section 3.1 ("Analyzing Internet-Drafts Based on Guidelines for Human
   Rights Considerations Model")).  This section provides guidance on
   how to conduct a human rights review, i.e., gauge the impact or
   potential impact of a protocol or standard on human rights.

   Human rights reviews can be done by any participant and can take
   place at different stages of the development process of an Internet-
   Draft.  Generally speaking, it is easier to influence the development
   of a technology at earlier stages than at later stages.  This does
   not mean that reviews at Last Call are not relevant, but they are
   less likely to result in significant changes in the reviewed
   document.

   Human rights reviews can be done by document authors, document
   shepherds, members of review teams, advocates, or impacted
   communities to influence the standards development process.  IETF
   documents can benefit from people with different knowledge,
   perspectives, and backgrounds, especially since their implementations
   can impact many different communities as well.

   Methods for analyzing technology for specific human rights impacts
   are still quite nascent.  Currently, five methods have been explored
   by the human rights review team, often in conjunction with each
   other.

3.1.  Analyzing Internet-Drafts Based on Guidelines for Human Rights
      Considerations Model

   This analysis of Internet-Drafts uses the model as described in
   Section 4.  The outlined categories and questions can be used to
   review an Internet-Draft.  The advantage of this is that it provides
   a known overview, and document authors can go back to this document
   as well as [RFC8280] to understand the background and the context.

3.2.  Analyzing Internet-Drafts Based on Their Perceived or Speculated
      Impact

   When reviewing an Internet-Draft, specific human rights impacts can
   become apparent by doing a close reading of the draft and seeking to
   understand how it might affect networks or society.  While less
   structured than the straight use of the human rights considerations
   model, this analysis may lead to new speculative understandings of
   links between human rights and protocols.

3.3.  Expert Interviews

   Interviews with document authors, active members of the working
   group, or experts in the field can help explore the characteristics
   of the protocol and its effects.  There are two main advantages to
   this approach:

   1.  It allows the reviewer to gain a deeper understanding of the
       (intended) workings of the protocol.

   2.  It allows for the reviewer to start a discussion with experts or
       even document authors, which can help the review gain traction
       when it is published.

3.4.  Interviews with Impacted Persons and Communities

   Protocols impact users of the Internet.  Interviews can help the
   reviewer understand how protocols affect the people that use the
   protocols.  Since human rights are best understood from the
   perspective of the rights-holder, this approach will improve the
   understanding of the real-world effects of the technology.  At the
   same time, it can be hard to attribute specific changes to a
   particular protocol; this is of course even harder when a protocol
   has not been widely deployed.

3.5.  Tracing Impacts of Implementations

   The reality of deployed protocols can be at odds with the
   expectations during the protocol design and development phase
   [RFC8980].  When a specification already has associated running code,
   the code can be analyzed either in an experimental setting or on the
   Internet where its impact can be observed.  In contrast to reviewing
   the draft text, this approach can allow the reviewer to understand
   how the specifications work in practice and potentially what unknown
   or unexpected effects the technology has.

4.  Guidelines for Human Rights Considerations

   This section provides guidance for document authors in the form of a
   questionnaire about protocols and how technical decisions can shape
   the exercise of human rights.  The questionnaire may be useful at any
   point in the design process, particularly after the document authors
   have developed a high-level protocol model as described in [RFC4101].
   These guidelines do not seek to replace any existing referenced
   specifications but, rather, contribute to them and look at the design
   process from a human rights perspective.

   Protocols and Internet Standards might benefit from a documented
   discussion of potential human rights risks arising from potential
   misapplications of the protocol or technology described in the
   Request for Comments (RFC).  This might be coupled with an
   Applicability Statement for that RFC.

   Note that the guidance provided in this section does not recommend
   specific practices.  The range of protocols developed in the IETF is
   too broad to make recommendations about particular uses of data or
   how human rights might be balanced against other design goals.
   However, by carefully considering the answers to the following
   questions, document authors should be able to produce a comprehensive
   analysis that can serve as the basis for discussion on whether the
   protocol adequately takes specific human rights threats into account.
   This guidance is meant to help the thought process of a human rights
   analysis; it does not provide specific directions for how to write a
   human rights considerations section (following the example set in
   [RFC6973]).

   In considering these questions, authors will need to be aware of the
   potential of technical advances or the passage of time to undermine
   protections.  In general, considerations of rights are likely to be
   more effective if they have a purpose and specific use cases rather
   than abstract, absolute goals.

   Also note that while the section uses the word "protocol", the
   principles identified in these questions may be applicable to other
   types of solutions (extensions to existing protocols, architecture
   for solutions to specific problems, etc.).

4.1.  Intermediaries

   Question(s): Does your protocol depend on or allow for protocol-
   specific functions at intermediary nodes?

   Explanation: The end-to-end principle [Saltzer] holds that certain
   functions can and should be performed at "ends" of the network.
   [RFC1958] states that "in very general terms, the community believes
   that the goal is connectivity ... and the intelligence is end to end
   rather than hidden in the network".  There are new opportunities for
   failure when a protocol exchange includes both endpoints and an
   intermediary, especially when the intermediary is not under control
   of either endpoint, or is even largely invisible to it, for instance,
   as with intercepting HTTPS proxies [HTTPS-interception].  This
   pattern also contributes to ossification because the intermediaries
   may impose protocol restrictions -- sometimes in violation of the
   specification -- that prevent the endpoints from using more modern
   protocols, as described in Section 9.3 of [RFC8446].

   Note that intermediaries are distinct from services.  In the former
   case, the third-party element is part of the protocol exchange;
   whereas in the latter, the endpoints communicate explicitly with the
   service.  The client/server pattern provides clearer separation of
   responsibilities between elements than having an intermediary.
   However, even in client/server systems, it is often good practice to
   provide for end-to-end encryption between endpoints for protocol
   elements that are outside of the scope of the service, as in the
   design of Messaging Layer Security (MLS) [RFC9420].

   Example: Encryption between the endpoints can be used to protect the
   protocol from interference by intermediaries.  The encryption of
   transport layer information in QUIC [RFC9000] and of the TLS Server
   Name Indication (SNI) field [TLS-ESNI] are examples of this practice.
   One consequence of this is to limit the extent to which network
   operators can inspect traffic, requiring them to have control of the
   endpoints in order to monitor their behavior.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.2.  Connectivity

   Questions(s): Is your protocol optimized for low-bandwidth and high-
   latency connections?  Could your protocol also be developed in a
   stateless manner?

   Considering the fact that network quality and conditions vary across
   geography and time, it is also important to design protocols such
   that they are reliable even on low-bandwidth and high-latency
   connections.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.3.  Reliability

   Question(s): Is your protocol fault tolerant?  Does it downgrade
   gracefully, i.e., with mechanisms for fallback and/or notice?  Can
   your protocol resist malicious degradation attempts?  Do you have a
   documented way to announce degradation?  Do you have measures in
   place for recovery or partial healing from failure?  Can your
   protocol maintain dependability and performance in the face of
   unanticipated changes or circumstances?

   Explanation: Reliability and resiliency ensures that a protocol will
   execute its function consistently and resistant to error, as
   described, and will function without unexpected results.  Measures
   for reliability in protocols assure users that their intended
   communication was successfully executed.

   A system that is reliable degrades gracefully and will have a
   documented way to announce degradation.  It will also have mechanisms
   to recover from failure gracefully and, if applicable, will allow for
   partial healing.

   It is important here to draw a distinction between random degradation
   and malicious degradation.  Some attacks against previous versions of
   TLS, for example, exploited TLS' ability to gracefully downgrade to
   non-secure cipher suites [FREAK] [Logjam]; from a functional
   perspective, this is useful, but from a security perspective, this
   can be disastrous.

   For reliability, it is necessary that services notify the users if a
   delivery fails.  In the case of real-time systems, in addition to the
   reliable delivery, the protocol needs to safeguard timeliness.

   Example: In the modern IP stack structure, a reliable transport layer
   requires an indication that transport processing has successfully
   completed, such as given by TCP's ACK message [RFC9293].  Similarly,
   an application-layer protocol may require an application-specific
   acknowledgement that contains, among other things, a status code
   indicating the disposition of the request (see [RFC3724]).

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

4.4.  Content Signals

   Question(s): Does your protocol include explicit or implicit
   plaintext elements, in either the payload or the headers, that can be
   used for differential treatment?  Is there a way to minimize leaking
   such data to network intermediaries?  If not, is there a way for
   deployments of the protocol to make the differential treatment
   (including prioritization of certain traffic), if any, auditable for
   negative impacts on net neutrality?

   Example: When network intermediaries are able to determine the type
   of content that a packet is carrying, then they can use that
   information to discriminate in favor of one type of content and
   against another.  This impacts users' ability to send and receive the
   content of their choice.

   As recommended in [RFC8558], protocol designers should avoid the
   construction of implicit signals of their content.  In general,
   protocol designers should avoid adding explicit signals for
   intermediaries.  In certain cases, it may be necessary to add such
   explicit signals, but designers should only do so when they provide
   clear benefit to end users (see [RFC8890] for more on the priority of
   constituencies).  In these cases, the implications of those signals
   for human rights should be documented.

   Note that many protocols provide signals that are intended for
   endpoints that can be used as implicit signals by intermediaries for
   traffic discrimination, based on either the content (e.g., TCP port
   numbers) or the sender/receiver (IP addresses).  Where possible,
   these should be protected from intermediaries by encryption.  In many
   cases (e.g., IP addresses), these signals are difficult to remove;
   but in other cases, such as TLS Application Layer Protocol
   Negotiation [RFC7301], there are active efforts to protect this data
   [TLS-ESNI].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to equal protection

4.5.  Internationalization

   Question(s): Does your protocol or specification define text string
   elements, in the payload or headers, that have to be understood or
   entered by humans?  Does your specification allow Unicode?  If so, do
   you accept texts in one character set (which must be UTF-8) or
   several (which is dangerous for interoperability)?  If charsets or
   encodings other than UTF-8 are allowed, does your specification
   mandate a proper tagging of the charset?  Did you have a look at
   [RFC6365]?

   Explanation: Internationalization refers to the practice of making
   protocols, standards, and implementations usable in different
   languages and scripts (see Section 4.6 ("Localization")).  In the
   IETF, internationalization means to add or improve the handling of
   non-ASCII text in a protocol [RFC6365].  A different perspective,
   more appropriate to protocols that are designed for global use from
   the beginning, is the definition used by the World Wide Web
   Consortium (W3C) [W3Ci18nDef]:

   |  Internationalization is the design and development of a product,
   |  application or document content that enables easy localization for
   |  target audiences that vary in culture, region, or language.

   Many protocols that handle text only handle one charset (US-ASCII) or
   leave the question of what coded charset and encoding are used up to
   local guesswork (which leads, of course, to interoperability
   problems).  If multiple charsets are permitted, they must be
   explicitly identified [RFC2277].  Adding non-ASCII text to a protocol
   allows the protocol to handle more scripts, hopefully representing
   users across the world.  In today's world, that is normally best
   accomplished by allowing only Unicode encoded in UTF-8.

   In current IETF practice [RFC2277], internationalization is aimed at
   user-facing strings, not protocol elements, such as the verbs used by
   some text-based protocols.  (Do note that some strings are both
   content and protocol elements, such as identifiers.)  Although this
   is reasonable practice for non-user visible elements, developers
   should provide full and equal support for all scripts and charsets in
   the user-facing features of protocols and for any content they carry.

   Example: See Section 4.6 ("Localization").

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

4.6.  Localization

   Question(s): Does your protocol uphold the standards of
   internationalization?  Have you made any concrete steps towards
   localizing your protocol for relevant audiences?

   Explanation: "Localization refers to the adaptation of a product,
   application or document content to meet the language, cultural and
   other requirements of a specific target market (a 'locale')"
   [W3Ci18nDef].  For our purposes, it can be described as the practice
   of translating an implementation to make it functional in a specific
   language or for users in a specific locale (see Section 4.5
   ("Internationalization")).  Internationalization is related to
   localization, but they are not the same.  Internationalization is a
   necessary precondition for localization.

   Example: The Internet is a global medium, but many of its protocols
   and products are developed with certain audiences in mind that often
   share particular characteristics like knowing how to read and write
   in American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) and
   knowing English.  This limits the ability of a large part of the
   world's online population from using the Internet in a way that is
   culturally and linguistically accessible.  An example of a standard
   that has taken into account the view that individuals like to have
   access to data in their preferred language can be found in [RFC5646].
   The document describes a way to label information with an identifier
   for the language in which it is written.  And this allows information
   to be presented and accessed in more than one language.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

   *  Right to freedom of expression

4.7.  Open Standards

   Question(s): Is your protocol fully documented in a way that it could
   be easily implemented, improved, built upon, and/or further
   developed?  Do you depend on proprietary code for the implementation,
   running, or further development of your protocol?  Does your protocol
   favor a particular proprietary specification over technically
   equivalent competing specification(s), for instance, by making any
   incorporated vendor specification "required" or "recommended"
   [RFC2026]?  Do you normatively reference another standard that is
   behind a paywall (and could you do without it)?  Are you aware of any
   patents that would prevent your standard from being fully implemented
   [RFC8179] [RFC6701]?

   Explanation: The Internet was able to be developed into the global
   network of networks because of the existence of open, non-proprietary
   standards [Zittrain].  They are crucial for enabling
   interoperability.  Yet, open standards are not explicitly defined
   within the IETF.  On the subject, [RFC2026] states:

   |  Various national and international standards bodies, such as ANSI,
   |  ISO, IEEE, and ITU-T, develop a variety of protocol and service
   |  specifications that are similar to Technical Specifications
   |  defined here [at the IETF].  National and international groups
   |  also publish "implementors' agreements" that are analogous to
   |  Applicability Statements, capturing a body of implementation-
   |  specific detail concerned with the practical application of their
   |  standards.  All of these are considered to be "open external
   |  standards" for the purposes of the Internet Standards Process.

   Similarly, [RFC3935] does not define open standards but does
   emphasize the importance of an "open process", i.e.:

   |  ... any interested person can participate in the work, know what
   |  is being decided, and make [their] voice heard on the issue.

   Open standards (and open source software) allow users to glean
   information about how the tools they are using work, including the
   tools' security and privacy properties.  They additionally allow for
   permissionless innovation, which is important to maintain the freedom
   and ability to freely create and deploy new protocols on top of the
   communications constructs that currently exist.  It is at the heart
   of the Internet as we know it, and to maintain its fundamentally open
   nature, we need to be mindful of the need for developing open
   standards.

   All standards that need to be normatively implemented should be
   freely available and with reasonable protection for patent
   infringement claims so that they can also be implemented in open
   source or free software.  Patents have often held back open
   standardization or been used against those deploying open standards,
   particularly in the domain of cryptography [Newegg].  An exemption of
   this is sometimes made when a standardized protocol normatively
   relies on specifications produced by others Standards Development
   Organizations (SDOs) that are not freely available.  Patents in open
   standards or in normative references to other standards should have a
   patent disclosure [Note-well], royalty-free licensing
   [Patent-policy], or some other form of fair, reasonable, and non-
   discriminatory terms.

   Example: [RFC6108] describes a system for providing critical end-user
   notifications to web browsers, which has been deployed by Comcast, an
   Internet Service Provider (ISP).  Such a notification system is being
   used to provide near-immediate notifications to customers, such as to
   warn them that their traffic exhibits patterns that are indicative of
   malware or virus infection.  There are other proprietary systems that
   can perform such notifications, but those systems utilize Deep Packet
   Inspection (DPI) technology.  In contrast, that document describes a
   system that does not rely upon DPI and is instead based on open IETF
   standards and open source applications.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

4.8.  Heterogeneity Support

   Question(s): Does your protocol support heterogeneity by design?
   Does your protocol allow for multiple types of hardware?  Does your
   protocol allow for multiple types of application protocols?  Is your
   protocol liberal in what it receives and handles?  Will it remain
   usable and open if the context changes?

   Explanation: The Internet is characterized by heterogeneity on many
   levels: devices, nodes, router scheduling algorithms, queue
   management mechanisms, routing protocols, levels of multiplexing,
   protocol versions and implementations, and underlying link layers
   (e.g., point-to-point, multi-access links, wireless, Fiber
   Distributed Data Interface (FDDI), etc.) in the traffic mix and in
   the levels of congestion at different times and places.  Moreover, as
   the Internet is composed of autonomous organizations and ISPs, each
   with their own separate policy concerns, there is a large
   heterogeneity of administrative domains and pricing structures.  As a
   result, the heterogeneity principle proposed in [RFC1958] needs to be
   supported by design [FIArch].

   Heterogeneity support in protocols can, thus, enable a wide range of
   devices and (by extension) users to participate on the network.

   Example: Heterogeneity significantly contributed to the success of
   the Internet architecture [Zittrain].  There is a famous quote often
   attributed to Niels Bohr: "Prediction is very difficult, especially
   if it's about the future."  This also holds true for future uses of
   the Internet architecture and infrastructure.  Therefore, as a rule
   of thumb, it is important to -- as far as possible -- design your
   protocol for different devices and uses, especially at lower layers
   of the stack.  However, if you choose not to do this, it could be
   relevant to document the reasoning for that.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

4.9.  Adaptability

   Question(s): Is your protocol written in a modular fashion, and does
   it facilitate or hamper extensibility?  In this sense, does your
   protocol impact permissionless innovation?  (See Section 4.7 ("Open
   Standards").)

   Explanation: Adaptability is closely interrelated with permissionless
   innovation: both maintain the freedom and ability to create and
   deploy new protocols on top of the communications constructs that
   currently exist.  It is at the heart of the Internet as we know it,
   and to maintain its fundamentally open nature, we need to be mindful
   of the impact of protocols on maintaining or reducing permissionless
   innovation to ensure that the Internet can continue to develop.

   Adaptability and permissionless innovation can be used to shape
   information networks as groups of users prefer.  Furthermore, a
   precondition of adaptability is the ability of the people who can
   adapt the network to be able to know and understand the network.
   This is why adaptability and permissionless innovation are inherently
   connected to the right to education and the right to science as well
   as the right to freedom of assembly and association and the right to
   freedom of expression, since it allows the users of the network to
   determine how to assemble, collaborate, and express themselves.

   Example: WebRTC generates audio and/or video data.  WebRTC can be
   used in different locations by different parties; WebRTC's standard
   Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) are developed to support
   applications from different voice service providers.  Multiple
   parties will have similar capabilities.  In order to ensure that all
   parties can build upon existing standards, these need to be adaptable
   and allow for permissionless innovation.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to education

   *  Right to science

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.10.  Integrity

   Question(s): Does your protocol maintain, assure, and/or verify the
   accuracy of payload data?  Does your protocol maintain and assure the
   consistency of data?  Does your protocol in any way allow for the
   data to be (intentionally or unintentionally) altered?

   Explanation: Integrity refers to the maintenance and assurance of the
   accuracy and consistency of data to ensure it has not been
   (intentionally or unintentionally) altered.

   Example: Integrity verification of data is important to prevent
   vulnerabilities and attacks from on-path attackers.  These attacks
   happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a
   communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle
   and changing the content of the data.  In practice, this looks as
   follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Alice sends a message to Bob,
   which Corinne intercepts and modifies.  Bob cannot see that the data
   from Alice was altered by Corinne.  Corinne intercepts and alters the
   communication as it is sent between Alice and Bob.  Corinne is able
   to control the communication content.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

4.11.  Authenticity

   Question(s): Do you have sufficient measures to confirm the truth of
   an attribute of a single piece of data or entity?  Can the attributes
   get garbled along the way (see Section 4.13 ("Security"))?  If
   relevant, have you implemented IPsec, DNS Security (DNSSEC), HTTPS,
   and other standard security best practices?

   Explanation: Authenticity ensures that data does indeed come from the
   source it claims to come from.  This is important to prevent certain
   attacks or unauthorized access and use of data.

   At the same time, authentication should not be used as a way to
   prevent heterogeneity support, as is often done for vendor lock-in or
   digital rights management.

   Example: Authentication of data is important to prevent
   vulnerabilities and attacks from on-path attackers.  These attacks
   happen when a third party (often for malicious reasons) intercepts a
   communication between two parties, inserting themselves in the middle
   and posing as both parties.  In practice, this looks as follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob.  Alice sends data to Bob.
   Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.  Corinne reads (and
   potentially alters) the message to Bob.  Bob cannot see that the data
   did not come from Alice but from Corinne.

   With proper authentication, the scenario would be as follows:

   Alice wants to communicate with Bob.  Alice sends data to Bob.
   Corinne intercepts the data sent to Bob.  Corinne reads and alters
   the message to Bob.  Bob is unable to verify whether that the data
   came from Alice.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to security

4.12.  Confidentiality

   Question(s): Does the protocol expose the transmitted data over the
   wire?  Does the protocol expose information related to identifiers or
   data?  If so, what does it reveal to each protocol entity (i.e.,
   recipients, intermediaries, and enablers) [RFC6973]?  What options
   exist for protocol implementers to choose to limit the information
   shared with each entity?  What operational controls are available to
   limit the information shared with each entity?

   What controls or consent mechanisms does the protocol define or
   require before personal data or identifiers are shared or exposed via
   the protocol?  If no such mechanisms or controls are specified, is it
   expected that control and consent will be handled outside of the
   protocol?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to share different
   pieces of information with different recipients?  If not, are there
   mechanisms that exist outside of the protocol to provide initiators
   with such control?

   Does the protocol provide ways for initiators to limit the sharing or
   expressing of individuals' preferences to recipients or
   intermediaries with regard to the collection, use, or disclosure of
   their personal data?  If not, are there mechanisms that exist outside
   of the protocol to provide users with such control?  Is it expected
   that users will have relationships that govern the use of the
   information (contractual or otherwise) with those who operate these
   intermediaries?  Does the protocol prefer encryption over cleartext
   operation?

   Explanation: Confidentiality refers to keeping your data secret from
   unintended listeners [RFC3552].  The growth of the Internet depends
   on users having confidence that the network protects their personal
   data [RFC1984].  The possibility of pervasive monitoring and
   surveillance undermines users' trust and can be mitigated by ensuring
   confidentiality, i.e., passive attackers should gain little or no
   information from observation or inference of protocol activity
   [RFC7258] [RFC7624].

   Example: Protocols that do not encrypt their payload make the entire
   content of the communication available to the idealized attacker
   along their path.  Following the advice in [RFC3365], most such
   protocols have a secure variant that encrypts the payload for
   confidentiality, and these secure variants are seeing ever-wider
   deployment.  A noteworthy exception is DNS [RFC1035], as DNSSEC
   [RFC4033] does not have confidentiality as a requirement.  This
   implies that, in the absence of the use of more recent standards like
   DNS over TLS [RFC7858] or DNS over HTTPS [RFC8484], all DNS queries
   and answers generated by the activities of any protocol are available
   to the attacker.  When store-and-forward protocols are used (e.g.,
   SMTP [RFC5321]), intermediaries leave this data subject to
   observation by an attacker that has compromised these intermediaries,
   unless the data is encrypted end-to-end by the application-layer
   protocol or the implementation uses an encrypted store for this data
   [RFC7624].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to security

4.13.  Security

   Question(s): Did you have a look at "Guidelines for Writing RFC Text
   on Security Considerations" [RFC3552]?  Have you found any attacks
   that are somewhat related to your protocol/specification yet
   considered out of scope of your document?  Would these attacks be
   pertinent to the human-rights-enabling features of the Internet (as
   described throughout this document)?

   Explanation: Security is not a single monolithic property of a
   protocol or system but rather a series of related yet somewhat
   independent properties.  Not all of these properties are required for
   every application.  Since communications are carried out by systems
   and access to systems is through communications channels, security
   goals obviously interlock, but they can also be independently
   provided [RFC3552].

   Typically, any protocol operating on the Internet can be the target
   of passive attacks (when the attacker can access and read packets on
   the network) and active attacks (when an attacker is capable of
   writing information to the network packets) [RFC3552].

   Example: See [RFC3552].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to security

4.14.  Privacy

   Question(s): Did you have a look at the guidelines described in
   Section 7 of "Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols"
   [RFC6973]?  Does your protocol maintain the confidentiality of
   metadata?  Could your protocol counter traffic analysis?  Does your
   protocol adhere to data minimization principles?  Does your document
   identify potentially sensitive data logged by your protocol and/or
   for how long that needs to be retained for technical reasons?

   Explanation: Privacy refers to the right of an entity (normally a
   person), acting on its own behalf, to determine the degree to which
   it will interact with its environment, including the degree to which
   the entity is willing to share its personal information with others
   [RFC4949].  If a protocol provides insufficient privacy protection,
   it may have a negative impact on freedom of expression as users self-
   censor for fear of surveillance or find that they are unable to
   express themselves freely.

   Example: See [RFC6973].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to non-discrimination

4.15.  Anonymity and Pseudonymity

   Question(s): Does your protocol make use of identifiers?  Are these
   identifiers persistent?  Are they used across multiple contexts?  Is
   it possible for the user to reset or rotate them without negatively
   impacting the operation of the protocol?  Are they visible to others
   besides the protocol endpoints?  Are they tied to real-world
   identities?  Have you considered "Privacy Considerations for Internet
   Protocols" [RFC6973], especially Section 6.1.2?

   Explanation: Most protocols depend on the use of some kind of
   identifier in order to correlate activity over time and space.  For
   instance:

   *  IP addresses are used as an identity for the source and
      destination for IP datagrams.

   *  QUIC connection identifiers are used to correlate packets
      belonging to the same connection.

   *  HTTP uses cookies to correlate multiple HTTP requests from the
      same client.

   *  Email uses email addresses of the form example@example.com to
      identify senders and receivers.

   In general, these identifiers serve a necessary function for protocol
   operations by allowing them to maintain continuity.  However, they
   can also create privacy risks.  There are two major ways in which
   those risks manifest:

   *  The identifier may itself reveal the user's identity in some way
      or be tied to an identifier that does, as is the case when E.164
      (telephone) numbers are used as identifiers for instant messaging
      systems.

   *  While the identifier may not reveal the user's identity, it may
      make it possible to link enough of a user's behavior to threaten
      their privacy, as is the case with HTTP cookies.

   Because identifiers are necessary for protocol operation, true
   anonymity is very difficult to achieve, but there are practices that
   promote user privacy even when identifiers are used.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.15.1.  Pseudonymity

   In general, user privacy is better preserved when identifiers are
   pseudonymous (not tied to a user's real-world identity).

   Example: In the development of the IPv6 protocol, it was discussed to
   embed a Media Access Control (MAC) address into unique IP addresses.
   This would make it possible for eavesdroppers and other information
   collectors to identify when different addresses used in different
   transactions actually correspond to the same node.  This is why
   standardization efforts like "Temporary Address Extensions for
   Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6" [RFC8981] and MAC
   address randomization [MAC-ADDRESS-RANDOMIZATION] have been pursued.

   Note that it is often attractive to try to create a pseudonym from a
   persistent identifier.  This can be very difficult to do correctly in
   a way that does not allow for recovering the persistent identifiers.

   Example: A common practice in web tracking is to "encrypt" email
   addresses by hashing them, thus allegedly making them "non-personally
   identifying".  However, because hash functions are public operations,
   it is possible to do a dictionary search for candidate email
   addresses and recover the original address [Email-hashing].

4.15.2.  Unlinkability

   Even true pseudonymous identifiers can present a privacy risk if they
   are used across a wide enough scope.  User privacy is better
   preserved if identifiers have limited scope both in time and space.

   Example: An example is the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
   where sending a persistent identifier as the client name was not
   mandatory but, in practice, done by many implementations before DHCP
   [RFC7844].

   Example: Third-party cookies in HTTP allow trackers to correlate HTTP
   traffic across sites.  This is the foundation of a whole ecosystem of
   web tracking.  Increasingly, web browsers are restricting the use of
   third-party cookies in order to protect user privacy.

4.16.  Censorship Resistance

   Question(s): Does your protocol architecture facilitate censorship?
   Does it include "choke points" that are easy to use for censorship?
   Does it expose identifiers that can be used to selectively block
   certain kinds of traffic?  Could it be designed to be more censorship
   resistant?  Does your protocol make it apparent or transparent when
   access to a resource is restricted and why it is restricted?

   Explanation: Governments and service providers block or filter
   content or traffic, often without the knowledge of end users
   [RFC7754].  For a survey of censorship techniques employed across the
   world, see [RFC9505], which lays out protocol properties that have
   been exploited to censor access to information.  Censorship
   resistance refers to the methods and measures to prevent Internet
   censorship.

   Example: The current design of the Web has a number of architectural
   choke points where it is possible for censors to intervene.  These
   include obtaining the control of the domain name itself, DNS blocking
   either at the protocol layer or at the resolver, IP address blocking,
   and blocking at the web server.  There has been extensive work on
   content distribution systems, which are intended to be more
   censorship resistant; and some, such as BitTorrent, are in wide use.
   However, these systems may have inferior reliability and performance
   compared to the Web (e.g., they do not support active content on the
   server).

   Example: Identifiers of content exposed within a protocol might be
   used to facilitate censorship by allowing the censor to determine
   which traffic to block.  DNS queries, the "host" request header in an
   HTTP request, and the Server Name Indication (SNI) in a Transport
   Layer Security (TLS) ClientHello are all examples of protocol
   elements that can travel in plaintext and be used by censors to
   identify what content a user is trying to access [RFC9505].  Protocol
   mechanisms such as Encrypted ClientHello [TLS-ESNI] or DNS over HTTPS
   [RFC8484] that encrypt metadata provide some level of resistance to
   this type of protocol inspection.  Full traffic encryption systems,
   such as Tor <https://torproject.org>, can also be used by people to
   access otherwise censored resources.

   Example: As noted above, one way to censor web traffic is to require
   the server to block it or require ISPs to block requests to the
   server.  In HTTP, denial or restriction of access can be made
   apparent by the use of status code 451, which allows server operators
   and intermediaries to operate with greater transparency in
   circumstances where issues of law or public policy affect their
   operation [RFC7725].  If a protocol potentially enables censorship,
   protocol designers should strive towards creating error codes that
   capture different scenarios (e.g., blocked due to administrative
   policy, unavailable because of legal requirements, etc.) to minimize
   ambiguity for end users.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to political participation

   *  Right to participate in cultural life, arts, and science

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.17.  Outcome Transparency

   Question(s): Are the intended and foreseen effects of your protocol
   documented and easily comprehensible?  Have you described the central
   use case(s) for your protocol with a clear description of expected
   behavior and how it may, or may not, impact other protocols,
   implementations, user expectations, or behavior?  Have you reviewed
   other protocols that solve similar problems, or made use of similar
   mechanisms, to see if there are lessons that can be learned from
   their use and misuse?

   Explanation: Certain technical choices may have unintended
   consequences.

   Example: Lack of authenticity may lead to lack of integrity and
   negative externalities; of which, spam is an example.  Lack of data
   that could be used for billing and accounting can lead to so-called
   "free" arrangements that obscure the actual costs and distribution of
   the costs, for example, the barter arrangements that are commonly
   used for Internet interconnection, and the commercial exploitation of
   personal data for targeted advertising, which is the most common
   funding model for the so-called "free" services such as search
   engines and social networks.  Unexpected outcomes might not be
   technical but rather architectural, social, or economic.  Therefore,
   it is of importance to document the intended outcomes and other
   possible outcomes that have been considered.

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to privacy

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to access to information

4.18.  Accessibility

   Question(s): Is your protocol designed to provide an enabling
   environment for all?  Have you looked at the W3C Web Accessibility
   Initiative for examples and guidance [W3CAccessibility]?

   Explanation: Sometimes in the design of protocols, websites, web
   technologies, or web tools, barriers are created that exclude people
   from using the Web. The Internet should be designed to work for all
   people, whatever their hardware, software, language, culture,
   location, or physical or mental ability.  When the Internet
   technologies meet this goal, it will be accessible to people with a
   diverse range of hearing, movement, sight, and cognitive ability
   [W3CAccessibility].

   Example: The HTML protocol as defined in [HTML] specifically requires
   that every image must have an alt attribute (with a few exceptions)
   to ensure images are accessible for people who cannot themselves
   decipher non-text content in web pages.

   Another example is the work done in the AVT and AVTCORE Working
   Groups in the IETF that enables text conversation in multimedia, text
   telephony, wireless multimedia, and video communications for sign
   language and lipreading (i.e., [RFC9071]).

   Impacts:

   *  Right to non-discrimination

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

   *  Right to education

   *  Right to political participation

4.19.  Decentralization

   Question(s): Can your protocol be implemented without a single point
   of control?  If applicable, can your protocol be deployed in a
   federated manner?  Does your protocol create additional centralized
   points of control?

   Explanation: Decentralization is one of the central technical
   concepts of the architecture of the Internet and is embraced as such
   by the IETF [RFC3935].  It refers to the absence or minimization of
   centralized points of control, a feature that is assumed to make it
   easy for new users to join and new uses to unfold [Ziewitz].  It also
   reduces issues surrounding single points of failure and distributes
   the network such that it continues to function even if one or several
   nodes are disabled.  With the commercialization of the Internet in
   the early 1990s, there has been a slow move away from
   decentralization, to the detriment of the technical benefits of
   having a decentralized Internet.  For a more detailed discussion of
   this topic, please see [Arkko].

   Example: The bits traveling the Internet are increasingly susceptible
   to monitoring and censorship from both governments and ISPs as well
   as third (malicious) parties.  The ability to monitor and censor is
   further enabled by the increased centralization of the network that
   creates central infrastructure points that can be tapped into.  The
   creation of peer-to-peer networks and the development of voice-over-
   IP protocols using peer-to-peer technology in combination with
   Distributed Hash Table (DHT) for scalability are examples of how
   protocols can preserve decentralization [Pouwelse].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to freedom of expression

   *  Right to freedom of assembly and association

4.20.  Remedy

   Question(s): Can your protocol facilitate a negatively impacted
   party's right to remedy without disproportionately impacting other
   parties' human rights, especially their right to privacy?

   Explanation: Providing access to remedy by states and corporations is
   a part of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
   [UNGP].  Access to remedy may help victims of human rights violations
   in seeking justice or allow law enforcement agencies to identify a
   possible violator.  However, current mechanisms in protocols that try
   to enable "attribution" to individuals impede the exercise of the
   right to privacy.  The former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
   Expression has also argued that anonymity is an inherent part of
   freedom of expression [Kaye].  Considering the potential adverse
   impact of attribution on the right to privacy and freedom of
   expression, enabling attribution on an individual level is most
   likely not consistent with human rights.

   Example: Adding personally identifiable information to data streams
   as a means to enable the human right to remedy might help in
   identifying a violator of human rights and provide access to remedy,
   but this would disproportionately affect all users right to privacy,
   anonymous expression, and association.  Furthermore, there are some
   recent advances in enabling abuse detection in end-to-end encrypted
   messaging systems, which also carry some risk to users' privacy
   [Messenger-franking] [Hecate].

   Impacts:

   *  Right to remedy

   *  Right to security

   *  Right to privacy

4.21.  Miscellaneous Considerations

   Question(s): Have you considered potential negative consequences
   (individual or societal) that your protocol or document might have?

   Explanation: Publication of a particular RFC under a certain status
   has consequences.  Publication as an Internet Standard as part of the
   Standards Track may signal to implementers that the specification has
   a certain level of maturity, operational experience, and consensus.
   Similarly, publication of a specification as an experimental document
   not part of the Standards Track would signal to the community that
   the document "may not be intended to be an Internet Standard, or it
   may be intended for eventual standardization but not yet ready" for
   wide deployment [RFC2026].  The extent of the deployment, and
   consequently its overall impact on end users, may depend on the
   document status presented in the RFC.  See [RFC2026] and updates to
   it for a fuller explanation.

5.  Document Status

   This research group document lays out best practices and guidelines
   for human rights reviews of network protocols, architectures, and
   other Internet-Drafts and RFCs.

6.  Security Considerations

   Article three of the "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" reads:
   "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person"
   [UDHR].  This article underlines the importance of security and its
   interrelation with human life and liberty; but since human rights are
   indivisible, interrelated, and interdependent, security is also
   closely linked to other human rights and freedoms.  This document
   seeks to strengthen human rights, freedoms, and security by relating
   and translating these concepts to concepts and practices as they are
   used in Internet protocol and architecture development.  The aim of
   this is to secure human rights and thereby improve the
   sustainability, usability, and effectiveness of the network.  The
   document seeks to achieve this by providing guidelines as done in
   Section 3 of this document.

7.  IANA Considerations

   This document has no IANA actions.

8.  Research Group Information

   The discussion list for the IRTF Human Rights Protocol Considerations
   Research Group is located at the e-mail address:
   <mailto:hrpc@ietf.org>.

   Information on the group and information on how to subscribe to the
   list is at: <https://www.irtf.org/mailman/listinfo/hrpc>.

   Archives of the list can be found at:
   <https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/hrpc/>.

9.  Informative References

   [Arkko]    Arkko, J., Trammell, B., Nottingham, M., Huitema, C.,
              Thomson, M., Tantsura, J., and N. ten Oever,
              "Considerations on Internet Consolidation and the Internet
              Architecture", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              arkko-iab-internet-consolidation-02, 8 July 2019,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-arkko-iab-
              internet-consolidation-02>.

   [Email-hashing]
              Acar, G., Englehardt, S., and A. Narayanan, "Four cents to
              deanonymize: Companies reverse hashed email addresses",
              April 2018, <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2018/04/09/
              four-cents-to-deanonymize-companies-reverse-hashed-email-
              addresses/>.

   [FIArch]   Papadimitriou, D., Zahariadis, T., Martinez-Julia, P.,
              Papafili, I., Morreale, V., Torelli, F., Sales, B., and P.
              Demeester, "Design Principles for the Future Internet
              Architecture", The Future Internet, pp. 55-67,
              DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-30241-1_6, January 2012,
              <https://link.springer.com/
              chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-30241-1_6>.

   [FREAK]    University of Michigan, "Tracking the FREAK Attack",
              Wayback Machine archive, March 2015,
              <https://web.archive.org/web/20150304002021/
              https://freakattack.com/>.

   [Hecate]   Issa, R., Alhaddad, N., and M. Varia, "Hecate, Abuse
              Reporting in Secure Messengers with Sealed Sender", 31st
              USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 22), pp
              2335-2352, August 2022,
              <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity22/
              presentation/issa>.

   [Hill]     Hill, R., "Partial Catalog of Human Rights Related to ICT
              Activities", May 2014,
              <http://www.apig.ch/UNIGE%20Catalog.pdf>.

   [HR-RT]    "IRTF-HRPC / reviews", commit 3f5fbff, December 2020,
              <https://github.com/IRTF-HRPC/reviews>.

   [HTML]     WHATWG, "HTML Living Standard", August 2024,
              <https://html.spec.whatwg.org/multipage/>.

   [HTTPS-interception]
              Durumeric, Z., Ma, Z., Springall, D., Barnes, R.,
              Sullivan, N., Bursztein, E., Bailey, M., Halderman, J.,
              and V. Paxson, "The Security Impact of HTTPS
              Interception", NDSS Symposium 2017,
              DOI 10.14722/ndss.2017.23456, February 2017,
              <https://doi.org/10.14722/ndss.2017.23456>.

   [ICCPR]    United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Civil and Political Rights", December 1966,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-
              mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-
              political-rights>.

   [ICESCR]   United Nations General Assembly, "International Covenant
              on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights", December 1966,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-
              mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-
              social-and-cultural-rights>.

   [IRP]      Internet Rights and Principles Dynamic Coalition, "10
              Internet Rights & Principles",
              <https://internetrightsandprinciples.org/campaign/>.

   [Jorgensen]
              Jørgensen, R. F., "An internet bill of rights", Research
              Handbook on Governance of the Internet, edited by Ian
              Brown. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing,
              DOI 10.4337/9781849805025.00022, April 2013,
              <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805025.00022>.

   [Kaye]     Kaye, D., "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
              Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of
              Opinion and Expression, David Kaye", A/HRC/29/32, May
              2015, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/798709?v=pdf>.

   [Logjam]   Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
              Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
              Thomé, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
              Zanella-Béguelin, S., and P. Zimmerman, "Imperfect Forward
              Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice", CCS '15:
              Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer
              and Communications Security, pp 5-17,
              DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, October 2015,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/2810103.2813707>.

   [MAC-ADDRESS-RANDOMIZATION]
              Zúñiga, J. C., Bernardos, C. J., Ed., and A. Andersdotter,
              "Randomized and Changing MAC Address State of Affairs",
              Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-madinas-mac-
              address-randomization-15, 15 July 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-madinas-
              mac-address-randomization-15>.

   [Messenger-franking]
              Grubbs, P., Lu, J., and T. Ristenpart, "Message Franking
              via Committing Authenticated Encryption", Cryptology
              ePrint Archive, Paper 2017/664, July 2017,
              <https://eprint.iacr.org/2017/664>.

   [Newegg]   Mullin, J., "Newegg on trial: Mystery company TQP rewrites
              the history of encryption", Ars Technica, November 2013,
              <https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/11/newegg-on-
              trial-mystery-company-tqp-re-writes-the-history-of-
              encryption/>.

   [Note-well]
              IETF, "Note Well",
              <https://www.ietf.org/about/note-well/>.

   [Orwat]    Orwat, C. and R. Bless, "Values and Networks: Steps Toward
              Exploring their Relationships", ACM SIGCOMM Computer
              Communication Review, vol. 46, no. 2, pp 25-31,
              DOI 10.1145/2935634.2935640, May 2016,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/2935634.2935640>.

   [Patent-policy]
              Weitzner, D., "W3C Patent Policy", W3C Recommendation,
              February 2004,
              <https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Patent-Policy-20040205/>.

   [Penney]   Penney, J., "Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and
              Wikipedia Use", Berkeley Technology Law Journal, vol. 31,
              no. 1, pp 117-182, DOI 10.15779/Z38SS13, September 2016,
              <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
              papers.cfm?abstract_id=2769645>.

   [Pouwelse] Pouwelse, J., Ed., "Media without censorship (CensorFree)
              scenarios", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-
              pouwelse-censorfree-scenarios-02, 22 October 2012,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-pouwelse-
              censorfree-scenarios-02>.

   [RFC1035]  Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
              specification", STD 13, RFC 1035, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
              November 1987, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035>.

   [RFC1958]  Carpenter, B., Ed., "Architectural Principles of the
              Internet", RFC 1958, DOI 10.17487/RFC1958, June 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1958>.

   [RFC1984]  IAB and IESG, "IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic
              Technology and the Internet", BCP 200, RFC 1984,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC1984, August 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1984>.

   [RFC2026]  Bradner, S., "The Internet Standards Process -- Revision
              3", BCP 9, RFC 2026, DOI 10.17487/RFC2026, October 1996,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2026>.

   [RFC2277]  Alvestrand, H., "IETF Policy on Character Sets and
              Languages", BCP 18, RFC 2277, DOI 10.17487/RFC2277,
              January 1998, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2277>.

   [RFC3365]  Schiller, J., "Strong Security Requirements for Internet
              Engineering Task Force Standard Protocols", BCP 61,
              RFC 3365, DOI 10.17487/RFC3365, August 2002,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3365>.

   [RFC3552]  Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing RFC
              Text on Security Considerations", BCP 72, RFC 3552,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3552, July 2003,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552>.

   [RFC3724]  Kempf, J., Ed., Austein, R., Ed., and IAB, "The Rise of
              the Middle and the Future of End-to-End: Reflections on
              the Evolution of the Internet Architecture", RFC 3724,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC3724, March 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3724>.

   [RFC3935]  Alvestrand, H., "A Mission Statement for the IETF",
              BCP 95, RFC 3935, DOI 10.17487/RFC3935, October 2004,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3935>.

   [RFC4033]  Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
              Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements",
              RFC 4033, DOI 10.17487/RFC4033, March 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033>.

   [RFC4101]  Rescorla, E. and IAB, "Writing Protocol Models", RFC 4101,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC4101, June 2005,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4101>.

   [RFC4949]  Shirey, R., "Internet Security Glossary, Version 2",
              FYI 36, RFC 4949, DOI 10.17487/RFC4949, August 2007,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949>.

   [RFC5321]  Klensin, J., "Simple Mail Transfer Protocol", RFC 5321,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC5321, October 2008,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5321>.

   [RFC5646]  Phillips, A., Ed. and M. Davis, Ed., "Tags for Identifying
              Languages", BCP 47, RFC 5646, DOI 10.17487/RFC5646,
              September 2009, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5646>.

   [RFC6108]  Chung, C., Kasyanov, A., Livingood, J., Mody, N., and B.
              Van Lieu, "Comcast's Web Notification System Design",
              RFC 6108, DOI 10.17487/RFC6108, February 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6108>.

   [RFC6365]  Hoffman, P. and J. Klensin, "Terminology Used in
              Internationalization in the IETF", BCP 166, RFC 6365,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6365, September 2011,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6365>.

   [RFC6701]  Farrel, A. and P. Resnick, "Sanctions Available for
              Application to Violators of IETF IPR Policy", RFC 6701,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6701, August 2012,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6701>.

   [RFC6973]  Cooper, A., Tschofenig, H., Aboba, B., Peterson, J.,
              Morris, J., Hansen, M., and R. Smith, "Privacy
              Considerations for Internet Protocols", RFC 6973,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC6973, July 2013,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973>.

   [RFC7258]  Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
              Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
              2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

   [RFC7301]  Friedl, S., Popov, A., Langley, A., and E. Stephan,
              "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Application-Layer Protocol
              Negotiation Extension", RFC 7301, DOI 10.17487/RFC7301,
              July 2014, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7301>.

   [RFC7624]  Barnes, R., Schneier, B., Jennings, C., Hardie, T.,
              Trammell, B., Huitema, C., and D. Borkmann,
              "Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A
              Threat Model and Problem Statement", RFC 7624,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7624, August 2015,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624>.

   [RFC7725]  Bray, T., "An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal Obstacles",
              RFC 7725, DOI 10.17487/RFC7725, February 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7725>.

   [RFC7754]  Barnes, R., Cooper, A., Kolkman, O., Thaler, D., and E.
              Nordmark, "Technical Considerations for Internet Service
              Blocking and Filtering", RFC 7754, DOI 10.17487/RFC7754,
              March 2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754>.

   [RFC7844]  Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
              Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.

   [RFC7858]  Hu, Z., Zhu, L., Heidemann, J., Mankin, A., Wessels, D.,
              and P. Hoffman, "Specification for DNS over Transport
              Layer Security (TLS)", RFC 7858, DOI 10.17487/RFC7858, May
              2016, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858>.

   [RFC8179]  Bradner, S. and J. Contreras, "Intellectual Property
              Rights in IETF Technology", BCP 79, RFC 8179,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8179, May 2017,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8179>.

   [RFC8280]  ten Oever, N. and C. Cath, "Research into Human Rights
              Protocol Considerations", RFC 8280, DOI 10.17487/RFC8280,
              October 2017, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8280>.

   [RFC8446]  Rescorla, E., "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol
              Version 1.3", RFC 8446, DOI 10.17487/RFC8446, August 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446>.

   [RFC8484]  Hoffman, P. and P. McManus, "DNS Queries over HTTPS
              (DoH)", RFC 8484, DOI 10.17487/RFC8484, October 2018,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484>.

   [RFC8558]  Hardie, T., Ed., "Transport Protocol Path Signals",
              RFC 8558, DOI 10.17487/RFC8558, April 2019,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8558>.

   [RFC8890]  Nottingham, M., "The Internet is for End Users", RFC 8890,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8890, August 2020,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8890>.

   [RFC8980]  Arkko, J. and T. Hardie, "Report from the IAB Workshop on
              Design Expectations vs. Deployment Reality in Protocol
              Development", RFC 8980, DOI 10.17487/RFC8980, February
              2021, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8980>.

   [RFC8981]  Gont, F., Krishnan, S., Narten, T., and R. Draves,
              "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address
              Autoconfiguration in IPv6", RFC 8981,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC8981, February 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8981>.

   [RFC9000]  Iyengar, J., Ed. and M. Thomson, Ed., "QUIC: A UDP-Based
              Multiplexed and Secure Transport", RFC 9000,
              DOI 10.17487/RFC9000, May 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000>.

   [RFC9071]  Hellström, G., "RTP-Mixer Formatting of Multiparty Real-
              Time Text", RFC 9071, DOI 10.17487/RFC9071, July 2021,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9071>.

   [RFC9293]  Eddy, W., Ed., "Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)",
              STD 7, RFC 9293, DOI 10.17487/RFC9293, August 2022,
              <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9293>.

   [RFC9420]  Barnes, R., Beurdouche, B., Robert, R., Millican, J.,
              Omara, E., and K. Cohn-Gordon, "The Messaging Layer
              Security (MLS) Protocol", RFC 9420, DOI 10.17487/RFC9420,
              July 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9420>.

   [RFC9505]  Hall, J. L., Aaron, M. D., Andersdotter, A., Jones, B.,
              Feamster, N., and M. Knodel, "A Survey of Worldwide
              Censorship Techniques", RFC 9505, DOI 10.17487/RFC9505,
              November 2023, <https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9505>.

   [Saltzer]  Saltzer, J. H., Reed, D. P., and D. D. Clark, "End-to-end
              arguments in system design", ACM Transactions on Computer
              Systems, vol. 2, no. 4, pp 277-288,
              DOI 10.1145/357401.357402, November 1984,
              <https://doi.org/10.1145/357401.357402>.

   [TLS-ESNI] Rescorla, E., Oku, K., Sullivan, N., and C. A. Wood, "TLS
              Encrypted Client Hello", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft,
              draft-ietf-tls-esni-20, 4 August 2024,
              <https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-tls-
              esni-20>.

   [UDHR]     United Nations General Assembly, "Universal Declaration of
              Human Rights", December 1948, <https://www.un.org/en/
              about-us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights>.

   [UNGP]     United Nations, "Guiding Principles on Business and Human
              Rights: Implementing the United Nations 'Protect, Respect
              and Remedy' Framework", January 2012,
              <https://www.ohchr.org/en/publications/reference-
              publications/guiding-principles-business-and-human-
              rights>.

   [UNHR]     United Nations, "The Core International Human Rights
              Instruments and their monitoring bodies",
              <https://www.ohchr.org/en/core-international-human-rights-
              instruments-and-their-monitoring-bodies>.

   [UNHRC2016]
              United Nations Human Rights Council, "The promotion,
              protection and enjoyment of human rights on the Internet",
              A/HRC/32/L.20, June 2016,
              <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/845728?ln=en>.

   [W3CAccessibility]
              W3C, "Accessibility",
              <https://www.w3.org/standards/webdesign/accessibility>.

   [W3Ci18nDef]
              Ishida, R. and S. Miller, "Localization vs.
              Internationalization", December 2005,
              <https://www.w3.org/International/questions/qa-i18n.en>.

   [Ziewitz]  Ziewitz, M. and I. Brown, "A Prehistory of Internet
              Governance", Research Handbook on Governance of the
              Internet, edited by Ian Brown. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar
              Publishing, DOI 10.4337/9781849805025.00008, April 2013,
              <https://doi.org/10.4337/9781849805025.00008>.

   [Zittrain] Zittrain, J., "The Future of the Internet and How to Stop
              It", Yale University Press, 2008,
              <https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/4455262>.

Acknowledgements

   Thanks to:

   *  Corinne Cath-Speth for work on [RFC8280].

   *  Reese Enghardt, Joe Hall, Avri Doria, Joey Salazar, Corinne Cath-
      Speth, Farzaneh Badii, Sandra Braman, Colin Perkins, John Curran,
      Eliot Lear, Mallory Knodel, Brian Trammell, Jane Coffin, Eric
      Rescorla, Sofía Celi, and the hrpc list for reviews and
      suggestions.

   *  Individuals who conducted human rights reviews for their work and
      feedback: Amelia Andersdotter, Shane Kerr, Beatrice Martini, Karan
      Saini, and Shivan Kaul Sahib.

Authors' Addresses

   Gurshabad Grover
   Email: gurshabad@cis-india.org


   Niels ten Oever
   University of Amsterdam
   Email: mail@nielstenoever.net
