<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" category="std" consensus="true" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-11" number="9654" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" ipr="trust200902" obsoletes="8954" updates="6960" submissionType="IETF" xml:lang="en" prepTime="2024-08-26T21:29:19" indexInclude="true" scripts="Common,Latin" tocDepth="3">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-ocsp-nonce-update-11" rel="prev"/>
  <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9654" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="OCSP Nonce Extension">Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9654" stream="IETF"/>
    <author fullname="Himanshu Sharma" initials="H" role="editor" surname="Sharma">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Netskope Inc</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor</street>
          <city>Santa Clara</city>
          <region>California</region>
          <code>95054</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>himanshu@netskope.com</email>
        <uri>www.netskope.com</uri>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="08" year="2024"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>lamps</workgroup>
    <keyword>OCSP</keyword>
    <keyword>Nonce</keyword>
    <keyword>backward compatibility</keyword>
    <abstract pn="section-abstract">
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">
            RFC 8954 imposed size constraints on the
            optional Nonce extension for the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP).
            OCSP is used to check the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension
            is used to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular
            OCSP request message.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-2">
            Some environments use cryptographic algorithms that generate a Nonce value that is longer than 32 octets. This document also 
   modifies the "Nonce" section of RFC 6960 to clearly define and differentiate the encoding format and values for easier implementation and understanding.  
   This document obsoletes RFC 8954, which includes updated ASN.1 modules
   for OCSP, and updates RFC 6960.
      </t>
    </abstract>
    <boilerplate>
      <section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9654" brackets="none"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
        </t>
      </section>
    </boilerplate>
    <toc>
      <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
        <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1">
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">Introduction</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ocsp-extensions">OCSP Extensions</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2.2.1">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="2.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-nonce-extension">Nonce Extension</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="3.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-replay-attack">Replay Attack</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="5.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="5.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-references">Informative References</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix A" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-asn1-modules">ASN.1 Modules</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="A.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ocsp-in-asn1-1998-syntax">OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="A.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-ocsp-in-asn1-2008-syntax">OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.c"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-address">Author's Address</xref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </toc>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1">
      <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">
            The Nonce extension was previously defined in <xref target="RFC6960" sectionFormat="of" section="4.4.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#section-4.4.1" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.
                The Nonce cryptographically binds an OCSP request and a response. It guarantees the freshness of an OCSP response and avoids replay attacks.
            This extension was updated in <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/>.  <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/> limits the maximum Nonce
   length to 32 octets.  To support cryptographic algorithms that generate
   a Nonce that is longer than 32 octets, this document updates the
   maximum allowed size of the Nonce to 128 octets.  In addition, this
   document recommends that the OCSP requester and responder use a 
                Nonce with a minimum length of 32 octets.
      </t>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-1.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-1">
    The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be
    interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
    shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-2">
      <name slugifiedName="name-ocsp-extensions">OCSP Extensions</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">
          The message formats for OCSP requests and responses are defined in
   <xref target="RFC6960" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6960"/> and the Nonce extension was updated in <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/>.  <xref target="RFC6960" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>
   also defines the standard extensions for OCSP messages based on the
   extension model employed in X.509 version 3 certificates (see
   <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/>).  <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/> replaces <xref target="RFC6960" sectionFormat="of" section="4.4.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#section-4.4.1" derivedContent="RFC6960"/> to limit the minimum
   and maximum length for the Nonce value.
   This document extends the maximum allowed nonce length to 128 octets and does not change the specifications
   of any of the other extensions defined in <xref target="RFC6960" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.
      </t>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-2.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-nonce-extension">Nonce Extension</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-1">
       The Nonce cryptographically binds a request and a response to prevent
       replay attacks.  The Nonce is included as one of the
       requestExtensions in requests; in responses, it is included as
       one of the responseExtensions.  In both the request and the response,
       the Nonce is identified by the object identifier id-pkix-ocsp-nonce, while the extnValue is the encoded value of Nonce.  If the
       Nonce extension is present, then the length of the Nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be at
       least 1 octet and can be up to 128 octets. Implementations compliant with <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/> 
       will not be able to process nonces 
       generated per the new specification with sizes in excess of the limit (32 octets) specified in <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/>.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-2">
        An OCSP requester that implements the extension in this document <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> use a minimum
       length of 32 octets for Nonce in the Nonce extension. 
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-3">
       An OCSP responder that supports the Nonce extension <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> accept Nonce lengths
   of at least 16 octets and up to and including 32 octets. A responder <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> choose to respond without the Nonce extension
   for requests in which the length of the Nonce is in between 1 octet and
       15 octets or 33 octets and 128 octets.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-4">
       Responders that implement the extension in this document <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> reject any OCSP
   request that has a Nonce with a length of either 0 octets or greater
   than 128 octets, with the malformedRequest OCSPResponseStatus as
       described in <xref target="RFC6960" sectionFormat="of" section="4.2.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#section-4.2.1" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-5">
       The value of the Nonce <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be generated using a cryptographically 
       strong pseudorandom number generator (see <xref target="RFC4086" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4086"/>). The minimum
           Nonce length of 1 octet is defined to provide backward compatibility 
           with older OCSP requesters that follow <xref target="RFC6960" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.
        </t>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="false" pn="section-2.1-6">
id-pkix-ocsp           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce     OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
Nonce ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1..128))
</sourcecode>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-7">The following is an example of an encoded OCSP Nonce extension with a 32-octet Nonce in
   hexadecimal format.</t>
        <artwork align="left" pn="section-2.1-8">
   30 2f 06 09 2b 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 02 04 22 04
   20 dd 49 d4 07 2c 44 9d a1 c3 17 bd 1c 1b df fe
   db e1 50 31 2e c4 cd 0a dd 18 e5 bd 6f 84 bf 14
   c8
</artwork>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-2.1-9">
   Here is the decoded version of the above example.
   Offset, Length, and Object Identifier are in decimal.
</t>
        <artwork align="left" pn="section-2.1-10">         
   Offset  Length
   0       47    : SEQUENCE {
   2       9     :  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ocspNonce
                 :   (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 1 2)
   13      34    :  OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
   15      32    :   OCTET STRING
                 :    DD 49 D4 07 2C 44 9D A1 C3 17 BD 1C 1B DF FE DB
                 :    E1 50 31 2E C4 CD 0A DD 18 E5 BD 6F 84 BF 14 C8
                 :  }
                 : }
    </artwork>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-3">
      <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">The security considerations of OCSP, in general, are described in
   <xref target="RFC6960" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.  During the interval in which the previous OCSP response
   for a certificate is not expired but the responder has a changed
   status for that certificate, a copy of that OCSP response can be used
   to indicate that the status of the certificate is still valid.
   Including a requester's nonce value in the OCSP response ensures that
   the response is the most recent response from the server and not an old
       copy.</t>
      <section numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-3.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-replay-attack">Replay Attack</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-3.1-1">The Nonce extension is used to avoid replay attacks.  Since the OCSP
   responder may choose not to send the Nonce extension in the OCSP
   response even if the requester has sent the Nonce extension in the
   request <xref target="RFC5019" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5019"/>, an on-path attacker can intercept the OCSP request
   and respond with an earlier response from the server without the
   Nonce extension.  This can be mitigated by configuring the server to
   use a short time interval between the thisUpdate and nextUpdate
       fields in the OCSP response.</t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="IANA" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-4">
      <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">
          For the ASN.1 modules in Appendixes <xref target="asn-1998" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A.1"/> and 
<xref target="asn-2008" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="A.2"/>, IANA has assigned the following
          object identifiers (OIDs) in the "SMI Security for PKIX                             
          Module Identifier" registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0): </t>
      <table anchor="iana-tab" align="center" pn="table-1">
        <name/>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Value</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">111</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-mod-ocsp-2024-88</td>
          </tr>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">112</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-mod-ocsp-2024-08</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references pn="section-5">
      <name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name>
      <references pn="section-5.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4086" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4086" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4086">
          <front>
            <title>Randomness Requirements for Security</title>
            <author fullname="D. Eastlake 3rd" initials="D." surname="Eastlake 3rd"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schiller" initials="J." surname="Schiller"/>
            <author fullname="S. Crocker" initials="S." surname="Crocker"/>
            <date month="June" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">Security systems are built on strong cryptographic algorithms that foil pattern analysis attempts. However, the security of these systems is dependent on generating secret quantities for passwords, cryptographic keys, and similar quantities. The use of pseudo-random processes to generate secret quantities can result in pseudo-security. A sophisticated attacker may find it easier to reproduce the environment that produced the secret quantities and to search the resulting small set of possibilities than to locate the quantities in the whole of the potential number space.</t>
              <t indent="0">Choosing random quantities to foil a resourceful and motivated adversary is surprisingly difficult. This document points out many pitfalls in using poor entropy sources or traditional pseudo-random number generation techniques for generating such quantities. It recommends the use of truly random hardware techniques and shows that the existing hardware on many systems can be used for this purpose. It provides suggestions to ameliorate the problem when a hardware solution is not available, and it gives examples of how large such quantities need to be for some applications. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="106"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4086"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4086"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5019" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5019" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5019">
          <front>
            <title>The Lightweight Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Profile for High-Volume Environments</title>
            <author fullname="A. Deacon" initials="A." surname="Deacon"/>
            <author fullname="R. Hurst" initials="R." surname="Hurst"/>
            <date month="September" year="2007"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This specification defines a profile of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) that addresses the scalability issues inherent when using OCSP in large scale (high volume) Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) environments and/or in PKI environments that require a lightweight solution to minimize communication bandwidth and client-side processing. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5019"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5019"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6960" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6960" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6960">
          <front>
            <title>X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP</title>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="M. Myers" initials="M." surname="Myers"/>
            <author fullname="R. Ankney" initials="R." surname="Ankney"/>
            <author fullname="A. Malpani" initials="A." surname="Malpani"/>
            <author fullname="S. Galperin" initials="S." surname="Galperin"/>
            <author fullname="C. Adams" initials="C." surname="Adams"/>
            <date month="June" year="2013"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies a protocol useful in determining the current status of a digital certificate without requiring Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs). Additional mechanisms addressing PKIX operational requirements are specified in separate documents. This document obsoletes RFCs 2560 and 6277. It also updates RFC 5912.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6960"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6960"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8954" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8954" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8954">
          <front>
            <title>Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Nonce Extension</title>
            <author fullname="M. Sahni" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Sahni"/>
            <date month="November" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies the updated format of the Nonce extension in the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) request and response messages. OCSP is used to check the status of a certificate, and the Nonce extension is used to cryptographically bind an OCSP response message to a particular OCSP request message. This document updates RFC 6960.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8954"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8954"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references pn="section-5.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="Err5891" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/errata/eid5891" quoteTitle="false" derivedAnchor="Err5891">
          <front>
            <title>Erratum ID 5891</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RFC Errata</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
          <refcontent>RFC 6960</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5912">
          <front>
            <title>New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)</title>
            <author fullname="P. Hoffman" initials="P." surname="Hoffman"/>
            <author fullname="J. Schaad" initials="J." surname="Schaad"/>
            <date month="June" year="2010"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The Public Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) certificate format, and many associated formats, are expressed using ASN.1. The current ASN.1 modules conform to the 1988 version of ASN.1. This document updates those ASN.1 modules to conform to the 2002 version of ASN.1. There are no bits-on-the-wire changes to any of the formats; this is simply a change to the syntax. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5912"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="asn-modules" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a">
      <name slugifiedName="name-asn1-modules">ASN.1 Modules</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">
        This section includes the ASN.1 modules for OCSP and replaces the entirety of <xref target="RFC8954" sectionFormat="of" section="5" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8954#section-5" derivedContent="RFC8954"/>. 
        It addresses Errata ID 5891 <xref target="Err5891" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Err5891"/> as well.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-2">
        <xref target="asn-1998" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.1"/> includes an ASN.1 module that conforms to the 1998
        version of ASN.1 for all syntax elements of OCSP.
        This module replaces the module in <xref target="RFC6960" sectionFormat="of" section="B.1" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#appendix-B.1" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-3">
        <xref target="asn-2008" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.2"/> includes an ASN.1 module, corresponding to the module 
        present in <xref target="asn-1998" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.1"/>, that conforms to the 2008 version of ASN.1.  This module 
        replaces the modules in <xref target="RFC5912" sectionFormat="of" section="4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5912#section-4" derivedContent="RFC5912"/> and 
        <xref target="RFC6960" sectionFormat="of" section="B.2" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6960#appendix-B.2" derivedContent="RFC6960"/>. Although a 2008 ASN.1 module is provided, the module in 
        <xref target="asn-1998" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A.1"/> remains the normative module per the policy of the PKIX Working Group.
      </t>
      <section anchor="asn-1998" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-ocsp-in-asn1-1998-syntax">OCSP in ASN.1 - 1998 Syntax</name>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true" pn="section-appendix.a.1-1">
OCSP-2024-88
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
        id-mod-ocsp-2024-88(111) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
    AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, CRLReason, GeneralName
    FROM PKIX1Implicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-pkix1-implicit(19) }

    Name, CertificateSerialNumber, Extensions,
    id-kp, id-ad-ocsp, Certificate, AlgorithmIdentifier
    FROM PKIX1Explicit88 -- From [RFC5280]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-pkix1-explicit(18) } ;

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest              TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature   [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName       [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions   [2] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm      AlgorithmIdentifier,
   signature               BIT STRING,
   certs               [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
                           Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                     CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions [0] EXPLICIT
                               Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier,
   issuerNameHash  OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash   OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseStatus     OCSPResponseStatus,
   responseBytes  [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful       (0),  -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest (1),  -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError    (2),  -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater         (3),  -- Try again later
                          -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired      (5),  -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized     (6)   -- Request unauthorized
}

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseType            OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
   response                OCTET STRING }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData          ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm       AlgorithmIdentifier,
  signature                BIT STRING,
  certs                [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
                           Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
   version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   responderID             ResponderID,
   producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
                           -- The format for GeneralizedTime is
                           -- as specified in Section 4.1.2.5.2
                           -- [RFC5280]
   responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
   responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
   byName              [1] Name,
   byKey               [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
            -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key (i.e., the
            -- SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING
            -- subjectPublicKey [excluding the tag, length, and
            -- number of unused bits] in the responder's
            -- certificate)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
   certID                  CertID,
   certStatus              CertStatus,
   thisUpdate              GeneralizedTime,
   nextUpdate          [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
   singleExtensions    [1] EXPLICIT Extensions OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good                [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked             [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown             [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime        GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason  [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF OBJECT IDENTIFIER

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer       Name,
   locator      AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
    crlUrl     [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
    crlNum     [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
    crlTime    [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
                                 PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
   sigIdentifier   AlgorithmIdentifier,
   certIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL }


-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad-ocsp }
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END

</sourcecode>
      </section>
      <section anchor="asn-2008" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-ocsp-in-asn1-2008-syntax">OCSP in ASN.1 - 2008 Syntax</name>
        <sourcecode type="asn.1" markers="true" pn="section-appendix.a.2-1">
OCSP-2024-08
     { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
       security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
       id-mod-ocsp-2024-08(112) }

DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

IMPORTS
    Extensions{}, EXTENSION
    FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }

    AlgorithmIdentifier{}, DIGEST-ALGORITHM,
    SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, PUBLIC-KEY
    FROM AlgorithmInformation-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-mod-algorithmInformation-02(58) }

    AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax, GeneralName,
    CrlEntryExtensions, CRLReason
    FROM PKIX1Implicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-implicit-02(59) }

    Name, Certificate, CertificateSerialNumber,
    id-kp, id-ad-ocsp
    FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
      internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
      id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }

    sa-dsaWithSHA1, sa-rsaWithMD2,
    sa-rsaWithMD5, sa-rsaWithSHA1
    FROM PKIXAlgs-2009 -- From [RFC5912]
    { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
    internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7)
    id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-algorithms2008-02(56) } ;

OCSPRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   tbsRequest             TBSRequest,
   optionalSignature  [0] EXPLICIT Signature OPTIONAL }

TBSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
   version            [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
   requestorName      [1] EXPLICIT GeneralName OPTIONAL,
   requestList             SEQUENCE OF Request,
   requestExtensions  [2] EXPLICIT Extensions
                          {{ re-ocsp-nonce | re-ocsp-response |
                          re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms,
                          ... }} OPTIONAL }

Signature ::= SEQUENCE {
   signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                            { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   signature            BIT STRING,
   certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
                        Certificate OPTIONAL }

Version ::= INTEGER  {  v1(0) }

Nonce ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1..128))

Request ::= SEQUENCE {
   reqCert                      CertID,
   singleRequestExtensions  [0] EXPLICIT Extensions
                                {{ re-ocsp-service-locator,
                                ... }} OPTIONAL }

CertID ::= SEQUENCE {
   hashAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                       { DIGEST-ALGORITHM, {...}},
   issuerNameHash  OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's DN
   issuerKeyHash   OCTET STRING, -- Hash of issuer's public key
   serialNumber    CertificateSerialNumber }

OCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  responseStatus       OCSPResponseStatus,
  responseBytes    [0] EXPLICIT ResponseBytes OPTIONAL }

OCSPResponseStatus ::= ENUMERATED {
   successful        (0), -- Response has valid confirmations
   malformedRequest  (1), -- Illegal confirmation request
   internalError     (2), -- Internal error in issuer
   tryLater          (3), -- Try again later
                          -- (4) is not used
   sigRequired       (5), -- Must sign the request
   unauthorized      (6)  -- Request unauthorized
}

RESPONSE ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER

ResponseSet RESPONSE ::= { basicResponse, ... }

ResponseBytes ::= SEQUENCE {
   responseType  RESPONSE.&amp;id ({ResponseSet}),
   response      OCTET STRING (CONTAINING RESPONSE.
                     &amp;Type({ResponseSet}{@responseType}))}

basicResponse RESPONSE ::=
   { BasicOCSPResponse IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-basic }

BasicOCSPResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  tbsResponseData      ResponseData,
  signatureAlgorithm   AlgorithmIdentifier
                           { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM,
                               { sa-dsaWithSHA1 |
                                 sa-rsaWithSHA1 |
                                 sa-rsaWithMD5  |
                                 sa-rsaWithMD2,
                                 ... }},
  signature            BIT STRING,
  certs            [0] EXPLICIT SEQUENCE OF
                       Certificate OPTIONAL }

ResponseData ::= SEQUENCE {
  version             [0] EXPLICIT Version DEFAULT v1,
  responderID             ResponderID,
  producedAt              GeneralizedTime,
  responses               SEQUENCE OF SingleResponse,
  responseExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
                              {{ re-ocsp-nonce |
                                 re-ocsp-extended-revoke,
                                 ... }} OPTIONAL }

ResponderID ::= CHOICE {
  byName   [1] Name,
  byKey    [2] KeyHash }

KeyHash ::= OCTET STRING
            -- SHA-1 hash of responder's public key
            -- (excluding the tag and length and number
            -- of unused bits)

SingleResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
  certID                CertID,
  certStatus            CertStatus,
  thisUpdate            GeneralizedTime,
  nextUpdate        [0] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL,
  singleExtensions  [1] EXPLICIT Extensions
                        {{ re-ocsp-crl |
                           re-ocsp-archive-cutoff |
                           CrlEntryExtensions,
                           ... }} OPTIONAL }

CertStatus ::= CHOICE {
   good     [0] IMPLICIT NULL,
   revoked  [1] IMPLICIT RevokedInfo,
   unknown  [2] IMPLICIT UnknownInfo }

RevokedInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
   revocationTime        GeneralizedTime,
   revocationReason  [0] EXPLICIT CRLReason OPTIONAL }

UnknownInfo ::= NULL

ArchiveCutoff ::= GeneralizedTime

AcceptableResponses ::= SEQUENCE OF RESPONSE.&amp;id({ResponseSet})

ServiceLocator ::= SEQUENCE {
   issuer    Name,
   locator   AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax }

CrlID ::= SEQUENCE {
   crlUrl   [0] EXPLICIT IA5String OPTIONAL,
   crlNum   [1] EXPLICIT INTEGER OPTIONAL,
   crlTime  [2] EXPLICIT GeneralizedTime OPTIONAL }

PreferredSignatureAlgorithms ::= SEQUENCE OF
                                 PreferredSignatureAlgorithm

PreferredSignatureAlgorithm ::= SEQUENCE {
   sigIdentifier  AlgorithmIdentifier
                      { SIGNATURE-ALGORITHM, {...} },
   certIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier {PUBLIC-KEY, {...}}
                      OPTIONAL }


-- Certificate Extensions

ext-ocsp-nocheck EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck }


-- Request Extensions

re-ocsp-nonce EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX Nonce IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-nonce }

re-ocsp-response EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX AcceptableResponses IDENTIFIED BY
    id-pkix-ocsp-response }

re-ocsp-service-locator EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX ServiceLocator IDENTIFIED BY
    id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator }

re-ocsp-preferred-signature-algorithms EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX PreferredSignatureAlgorithms IDENTIFIED BY
    id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs  }


-- Response Extensions

re-ocsp-crl EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX CrlID IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-crl }

re-ocsp-archive-cutoff EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX ArchiveCutoff IDENTIFIED BY
    id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff }

re-ocsp-extended-revoke EXTENSION ::= {
    SYNTAX NULL IDENTIFIED BY id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke }


-- Object Identifiers

id-kp-OCSPSigning            OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 9 }
id-pkix-ocsp                 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ad-ocsp
id-pkix-ocsp-basic           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 1 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nonce           OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 2 }
id-pkix-ocsp-crl             OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 3 }
id-pkix-ocsp-response        OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 4 }
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck         OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 5 }
id-pkix-ocsp-archive-cutoff  OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 6 }
id-pkix-ocsp-service-locator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 7 }
id-pkix-ocsp-pref-sig-algs   OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 8 }
id-pkix-ocsp-extended-revoke OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix-ocsp 9 }

END

</sourcecode>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="Acknowledgements" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
      <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgements">Acknowledgements</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-1">
          The authors of this document thank <contact fullname="Mohit Sahni"/> for his work to produce <xref target="RFC8954" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8954"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-2">
          The authors also thank <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Corey Bonnell"/>, 
          <contact fullname="Michael StJohns"/>, <contact fullname="Tomas Gustavsson"/>, and <contact fullname="Carl Wallace"/> for their feedback and suggestions.
 
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.c">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authors-address">Author's Address</name>
      <author fullname="Himanshu Sharma" initials="H" role="editor" surname="Sharma">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Netskope Inc</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street>2445 Augustine Dr 3rd floor</street>
            <city>Santa Clara</city>
            <region>California</region>
            <code>95054</code>
            <country>United States of America</country>
          </postal>
          <email>himanshu@netskope.com</email>
          <uri>www.netskope.com</uri>
        </address>
      </author>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
