<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8'?>
<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" version="3" category="std" docName="draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-11" number="9632" submissionType="IETF" consensus="true" ipr="trust200902" obsoletes="9092" updates="" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" tocInclude="true" tocDepth="3" xml:lang="en" prepTime="2024-08-07T15:09:20" indexInclude="true" scripts="Common,Latin">
  <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-opsawg-9092-update-11" rel="prev"/>
  <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9632" rel="alternate"/>
  <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"/>
  <front>
    <title abbrev="Finding and Using Geofeed Data">Finding and Using Geofeed Data</title>
    <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9632" stream="IETF"/>
    <author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IIJ Research &amp; Arrcus</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>5147 Crystal Springs</street>
          <city>Bainbridge Island</city>
          <region>Washington</region>
          <code>98110</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>randy@psg.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Massimo Candela" initials="M." surname="Candela">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">NTT</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>Veemweg 23</street>
          <city>Barneveld</city>
          <code>3771 MT</code>
          <country>Netherlands</country>
        </postal>
        <email>massimo@ntt.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Warren Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari">
      <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Google</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>1600 Amphitheatre Parkway</street>
          <city>Mountain View</city>
          <region>CA</region>
          <code>94043</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>warren@kumari.net</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author fullname="Russ Housley" initials="R" surname="Housley">
      <organization abbrev="Vigil Security" showOnFrontPage="true">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
      <address>
        <postal>
          <street>516 Dranesville Road</street>
          <city>Herndon</city>
          <region>VA</region>
          <code>20170</code>
          <country>United States of America</country>
        </postal>
        <email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date month="08" year="2024"/>
    <area>OPS</area>
    <workgroup>opsawg</workgroup>
    <keyword>geolocation</keyword>
    <keyword>geo-location</keyword>
    <keyword>RPSL</keyword>
    <keyword>inetnum</keyword>
    <abstract pn="section-abstract">
      <t indent="0" pn="section-abstract-1">
        This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
        Specification Language (RPSL) inetnum: class to refer specifically to
        geofeed comma-separated values (CSV) data files and describes an
        optional scheme that uses the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
        to authenticate the geofeed data files.  This document obsoletes
        RFC 9092.
      </t>
    </abstract>
    <boilerplate>
      <section anchor="status-of-memo" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-status-of-this-memo">Status of This Memo</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-1">
            This is an Internet Standards Track document.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-2">
            This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
            (IETF).  It represents the consensus of the IETF community.  It has
            received public review and has been approved for publication by
            the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG).  Further
            information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of 
            RFC 7841.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.1-3">
            Information about the current status of this document, any
            errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
            <eref target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9632" brackets="none"/>.
        </t>
      </section>
      <section anchor="copyright" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-boilerplate.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-copyright-notice">Copyright Notice</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-1">
            Copyright (c) 2024 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
            document authors. All rights reserved.
        </t>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-boilerplate.2-2">
            This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
            Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
            (<eref target="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info" brackets="none"/>) in effect on the date of
            publication of this document. Please review these documents
            carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
            respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
            document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
            Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
            warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.
        </t>
      </section>
    </boilerplate>
    <toc>
      <section anchor="toc" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="exclude" pn="section-toc.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-table-of-contents">Table of Contents</name>
        <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1">
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-introduction">Introduction</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1">
                <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.1.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="1.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-1.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.2">
            <t indent="0" keepWithNext="true" pn="section-toc.1-1.2.1"><xref derivedContent="2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-geofeed-files">Geofeed Files</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.3">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><xref derivedContent="3" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-3"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-inetnum-class">inetnum: Class</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.4">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><xref derivedContent="4" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-4"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-fetching-geofeed-data">Fetching Geofeed Data</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.5">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><xref derivedContent="5" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-5"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authenticating-geofeed-data">Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.6">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><xref derivedContent="6" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-6"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-operational-considerations">Operational Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.7">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><xref derivedContent="7" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-7"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-privacy-considerations">Privacy Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.8">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><xref derivedContent="8" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-8"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-implementation-status">Implementation Status</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.9">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><xref derivedContent="9" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-9"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.10">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><xref derivedContent="10" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-10"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><xref derivedContent="11" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11"/>. <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-references">References</xref></t>
            <ul bare="true" empty="true" indent="2" spacing="compact" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2">
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1"><xref derivedContent="11.1" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11.1"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-normative-references">Normative References</xref></t>
              </li>
              <li pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2">
                <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1"><xref derivedContent="11.2" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" target="section-11.2"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-informative-references">Informative References</xref></t>
              </li>
            </ul>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.12">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><xref derivedContent="Appendix A" format="default" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.a"/>.  <xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-example">Example</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.13">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.b"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-acknowledgments">Acknowledgments</xref></t>
          </li>
          <li pn="section-toc.1-1.14">
            <t indent="0" pn="section-toc.1-1.14.1"><xref derivedContent="" format="none" sectionFormat="of" target="section-appendix.c"/><xref derivedContent="" format="title" sectionFormat="of" target="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</xref></t>
          </li>
        </ul>
      </section>
    </toc>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="intro" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-1">
      <name slugifiedName="name-introduction">Introduction</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-1">
        Providers of Internet content and other services may wish to customize
        those services based on the geographic location of the user of the
        service.  This is often done using the source IP address used to
        contact the service, which may not point to a user; see <xref target="RFC6269" sectionFormat="of" section="14" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6269#section-14" derivedContent="RFC6269"/> in particular. 
	Also, administrators of infrastructure and other services might wish 
	to publish the locale of said infrastructure or services.
        infrastructure and other services might wish to publish the locale of
        their services. <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> defines
        geofeed, a syntax to associate geographic locales with IP addresses,
        but it does not specify how to find the relevant geofeed data given an
        IP address.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-2">
        This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy
        Specification Language (RPSL) <xref target="RFC2725" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2725"/> inetnum: class to refer specifically to geofeed
        data files and how to prudently use them.  In all places inetnum: is
        used, inet6num: should also be assumed <xref target="RFC4012" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4012"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-3">
        The reader may find <xref target="INETNUM" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="INETNUM"/>
        and <xref target="INET6NUM" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="INET6NUM"/> informative, and
        certainly more verbose, descriptions of the inetnum: database
        classes.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-4">
        An optional utterly awesome but slightly complex means for
        authenticating geofeed data is also defined in <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-1-5">This document obsoletes <xref target="RFC9092" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9092"/>.  Changes from <xref target="RFC9092" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9092"/> include the following:
      </t>
      <ul spacing="normal" bare="false" empty="false" indent="3" pn="section-1-6">
        <li pn="section-1-6.1">
            RIPE has implemented the geofeed: attribute.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.2">
            This document allows, but discourages, an inetnum: to have both a geofeed
            remarks: attribute and a geofeed: attribute.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.3">
	    The Authentication section (<xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>) has been rewritten to be more
	    formal.
	  </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.4">
            Geofeed files are only UTF-8 CSV.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.5">
            This document stresses that authenticating geofeed data is optional.
          </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.6">
            IP Address Delegation extensions must not use "inherit".
          </li>
        <li pn="section-1-6.7">
            If geofeed data are present, geographic location
            hints in other data should be ignored.
          </li>
      </ul>
      <section numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-1.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-requirements-language">Requirements Language</name>
        <t indent="0" pn="section-1.1-1">
    The key words "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be
    interpreted as described in BCP 14 <xref target="RFC2119" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8174"/> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as
    shown here.
        </t>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="gf" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-2">
      <name slugifiedName="name-geofeed-files">Geofeed Files</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-1">
        Geofeed files are described in <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/>.  They provide a facility for an IP address
        resource "owner" to associate those IP addresses to geographic
        locales.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-2">
        Per <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/>, geofeed files consist of comma-separated
        values (CSV) in UTF-8 text format, not HTML, richtext, or other
        formats.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-3">
        Content providers and other parties who wish to locate an IP
        address to a geographic locale need to find the relevant geofeed
        data.  In <xref target="inetnum" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 3"/>, this
        document specifies how to find the relevant geofeed <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> file given an IP address.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-4">
        Geofeed data for large providers with significant horizontal
        scale and high granularity can be quite large. The size of a
        file can be even larger if an unsigned geofeed file combines
        data for many prefixes, if dual IPv4/IPv6 spaces are
        represented, etc.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-5">
        Geofeed data do have privacy considerations (see <xref target="privacy" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 7"/>); this process makes bulk
        access to those data easier.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-2-6">
        This document also suggests an optional signature to strongly
        authenticate the data in the geofeed files.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="inetnum" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-3">
      <name slugifiedName="name-inetnum-class">inetnum: Class</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-1">
        The original RPSL specifications starting with <xref target="RIPE81" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RIPE81"/>, <xref target="RIPE181" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RIPE181"/>, and a
        trail of subsequent documents were written by the RIPE community.  The
        IETF standardized RPSL in <xref target="RFC2622" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2622"/> and <xref target="RFC4012" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4012"/>.
        Since then, it has been modified and extensively enhanced in the
        Regional Internet Registry (RIR) community, mostly by RIPE <xref target="RIPE-DB" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RIPE-DB"/>.  At the time of publishing this
        document, change control of the RPSL effectively lies in the operator
        community.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-2">
  The inetnum: database class is specified by the RPSL, as well as 
  Routing Policy System Security <xref target="RFC2725" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC2725"/> and RPSLng <xref target="RFC4012" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4012"/>,
  which are used by the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).
  Each of these
        objects describes an IP address range and its attributes.  The
        inetnum: objects form a hierarchy ordered on the address space.  </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-3"> Ideally, the RPSL would be augmented to define a new RPSL geofeed:
        attribute in the inetnum: class.  Absent implementation of the
        geofeed: attribute in a particular RIR database, this document defines
        the syntax of a Geofeed remarks: attribute, which contains an HTTPS
        URL of a geofeed file.  The format of the inetnum: geofeed remarks:
        attribute <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be as in this example, "remarks: Geofeed
        ", where the token "Geofeed " <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be case sensitive,
        followed by a URL that will vary, but it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> refer
        only to a single geofeed <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/>
        file.
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="rpsl" markers="false" pn="section-3-4">
    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-5">
        While we leave global agreement of RPSL modification to the relevant
        parties, we specify that a proper geofeed: attribute in the inetnum:
        class <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be "geofeed:" and <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        be followed by a single URL that will vary, but it <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        refer only to a single geofeed <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> file.
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="rpsl" markers="false" pn="section-3-6">
    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
    geofeed: https://example.com/geofeed
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-7">
        The URL uses HTTPS, so the WebPKI provides authentication,
        integrity, and confidentiality for the fetched geofeed file.
        However, the WebPKI cannot provide authentication of IP address
        space assignment.  In contrast, the RPKI (see <xref target="RFC6481" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6481"/>) can be used to authenticate
        IP space assignment; see optional authentication in <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-8">
        Until all producers of inetnum: objects, i.e., the RIRs, state
        that they have migrated to supporting a geofeed: attribute,
        consumers looking at inetnum: objects to find geofeed URLs <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        be able to consume both the remarks: and geofeed: forms.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-9">
        The migration not only implies that the RIRs support the
        geofeed: attribute, but that all registrants have migrated any
        inetnum: objects from remarks: to geofeed: attributes.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-10">
        Any particular inetnum: object <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> have, at most, one geofeed
        reference, whether a remarks: or a proper geofeed: attribute
        when it is implemented.  As the remarks: form cannot be
        formally checked by the RIR, this cannot be formally enforced.
        A geofeed: attribute is preferred, of course, if the RIR
        supports it.  If there is more than one type of attribute in the
        intetnum: object, the geofeed: attribute <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-11">
	For inetnum: objects covering the same address range, a signed geofeed
	file <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be preferred over an unsigned file.  If none are
	signed, or more than one is signed, the (signed) inetnum: with
	the most recent last-modified: attribute <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be preferred.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-12">
        If a geofeed file describes multiple disjoint ranges of IP
        address space, there are likely to be geofeed references from
        multiple inetnum: objects.  Files with geofeed references from
        multiple inetnum: objects are not compatible with the signing
        procedure in <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-13">
        An unsigned, and only an unsigned, geofeed file <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be
        referenced by multiple inetnum: objects and <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> contain prefixes from
        more than one registry.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-14">
        When fetching, the most specific inetnum: object with a geofeed
        reference <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-3-15">
        It is significant that geofeed data may have finer granularity
        than the inetnum: that refers to them.  For example, an INETNUM
        object for an address range P could refer to a geofeed file in
        which P has been subdivided into one or more longer prefixes.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="fetch" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-4">
      <name slugifiedName="name-fetching-geofeed-data">Fetching Geofeed Data</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-1">
        This document provides a guideline for how interested
        parties should fetch and read geofeed files.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-2">
        Historically, before <xref target="RFC9092" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9092"/>, this was done in
        varied ways, at the discretion of the implementor, often without
        consistent authentication, where data were mostly imported from
        email without formal authorization or validation.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-3">
        To minimize the load on RIRs' WHOIS <xref target="RFC3912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3912"/>
        services, the RIR's FTP <xref target="RFC0959" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC0959"/> services <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>
        be used for large-scale access to gather inetnum: objects with geofeed
        references.  This uses efficient bulk access instead of fetching
        via brute-force search through the IP space.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-4">
        When reading data from an unsigned geofeed file, one <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore
        data outside the referring inetnum: object's address range.
        This is to avoid importing data about ranges not under the
        control of the operator.  Note that signed files <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only
	contain prefixes within the referring inetnum:'s range as
	mandated in <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-5">
	If geofeed files are fetched, other location information from
	the inetnum: <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-6">
        Given an address range of interest, the most specific inetnum:
        object with a geofeed reference <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used to fetch the
        geofeed file. For example, if the fetching party finds
        the following inetnum: objects:
</t>
      <sourcecode type="rpsl" markers="false" pn="section-4-7">
    inetnum: 192.0.0.0/22 # example
    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_1

    inetnum: 192.0.2.0/24 # example
    remarks: Geofeed https://example.com/geofeed_2
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-8">
         An application looking for geofeed data for 192.0.2.0/29 <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
         ignore data in geofeed_1 because 192.0.2.0/29 is within the
         more specific 192.0.2.0/24 inetnum: covering that address range
         and that inetnum: does have a geofeed reference.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-9">
        Hints in inetnum: objects such as country:, geoloc:, etc., tend to be
        administrative, and not deployment specific.  Consider large,
        possibly global, providers with headquarters very far from most
        of their deployments.  Therefore, if geofeed data are specified,
        either as a geofeed: attribute or in a geofeed remarks:
        attribute, other geographic hints such as country:, geoloc:, DNS
        geoloc RRsets, etc., for that address range <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be ignored.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-10">
        There is open-source code to traverse the RPSL data across all of the
        RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and process them <xref target="GEOFEED-FINDER" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="GEOFEED-FINDER"/>.  It implements the steps above and of all
        the Operational Considerations described in <xref target="ops" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 6"/>,
        including caching.  It produces a single geofeed file, merging all the
        geofeed files found.  This open-source code can be run daily by a
        cron job, and the output file can be directly used.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-4-11">
	RIRs are converging on Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
	support, which includes geofeed data; see <xref target="I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RDAP-GEOFEED"/>.  This <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> be used for bulk retrieval of geofeed data.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="auth" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-5">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authenticating-geofeed-data">Authenticating Geofeed Data (Optional)</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-1">
	The question arises whether a particular geofeed <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> data set is valid, i.e., is authorized by the
	"owner" of the IP address space and is authoritative in some sense.
	The inetnum: that points to the geofeed <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> file
	provides some assurance.  Unfortunately, the RPSL in some repositories
	is weakly authenticated at best.  An approach where the RPSL was
	signed per <xref target="RFC7909" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7909"/> would be good, except it would
	have to be deployed by all RPSL registries, and there is a fair number
	of them.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-2">
	The remainder of this section specifies an optional
	authenticator for the geofeed data set that follows "Signed
	Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
	(RPKI)" <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-3">
	A single optional authenticator <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> be appended to a geofeed
	<xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> file.  It is a digest of the main body
	of the file signed by the private key of the relevant RPKI
	certificate for a covering address range.  The following format
	bundles the relevant RPKI certificate with a signature over the
	geofeed text.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-4">
	The canonicalization procedure converts the data from their
	internal character representation to the UTF-8 <xref target="RFC3629" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3629"/> character encoding, and the &lt;CRLF&gt;
	sequence <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used to denote the end of each line of text.  A
	blank line is represented solely by the &lt;CRLF&gt; sequence.
	For robustness, any non-printable characters <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be changed
	by canonicalization.  Trailing blank lines <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> appear at
	the end of the file.  That is, the file must not end with
	multiple consecutive &lt;CRLF&gt; sequences.  Any end-of-file
	marker used by an operating system is not considered to be part
	of the file content.  When present, such end-of-file markers
	<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> be covered by the digital signature.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-5">
	If the authenticator is not in the canonical form described above,
	then the authenticator is invalid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-6">
	Borrowing detached signatures from <xref target="RFC5485" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5485"/>, after
	file canonicalization, the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/> is used to create a detached DER-encoded signature
	that is then Base64 encoded with padding (as defined in <xref target="RFC4648" sectionFormat="of" section="4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648#section-4" derivedContent="RFC4648"/>) and line wrapped to
	72 or fewer characters.  The same digest algorithm <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
	be used for calculating the message digest of the content being
	signed, which is the geofeed file, and for calculating the message
	digest on the SignerInfo SignedAttributes <xref target="RFC8933" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8933"/>.
	The message digest algorithm identifier <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear in
	both the CMS SignedData DigestAlgorithmIdentifiers and the SignerInfo
	DigestAlgorithmIdentifier <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/>.  The RPKI
	certificate covering the geofeed inetnum: object's address range is
	included in the CMS SignedData certificates field <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-7">
	The address range of the signing certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> cover all
	prefixes in the signed geofeed file.  If not, the authenticator
	is invalid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-8">
	The signing certificate <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> include the Autonomous System
	Identifier Delegation certificate extension <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.  If it is present, the authenticator is
	invalid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-9">
        As with many other RPKI signed objects, the IP Address Delegation
        certificate extension <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> use the "inherit"
        capability defined in <xref target="RFC3779" sectionFormat="of" section="2.2.3.5" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3779#section-2.2.3.5" derivedContent="RFC3779"/>.  If
        "inherit" is used, the authenticator is invalid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-10">
	An IP Address Delegation extension using "inherit" would
	complicate processing.  The implementation would have to build
	the certification path from the end entity to the trust anchor,
	then validate the path from the trust anchor to the end entity,
	and then the parameter would have to be remembered when the
	validated public key was used to validate a signature on a CMS
	object.  Having to remember things from certification path
	validation for use with CMS object processing would be quite
	complex and error-prone.  Additionally, the certificates do not get that
	much bigger by repeating the information.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-11">
	An address range A "covers" address range B if the range of B is
	identical to or a subset of A.  "Address range" is used here
	because inetnum: objects and RPKI certificates need not align on
	Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) <xref target="RFC4632" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC4632"/>
	prefix boundaries, while those of the lines in a geofeed file do
	align.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-12">
	The Certification Authority (CA) <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> sign only one geofeed file
	with each generated private key and <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> generate a new key
	pair for each new version of a particular geofeed file.  The CA
	<bcp14>MUST</bcp14> generate a new end entity (EE) certificate for each signing
	of a particular geofeed file.  An associated EE certificate used
	in this fashion is termed a "one-time-use" EE certificate (see
	<xref target="RFC6487" sectionFormat="of" section="3" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6487#section-3" derivedContent="RFC6487"/>).
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-13">
	Identifying the private key associated with the certificate and
	getting the department that controls the private key (which
	might be stored in a Hardware Security Module (HSM)) to generate
	the CMS signature is left as an exercise for the implementor.
	On the other hand, verifying the signature has no similar
	complexity; the certificate, which is validated in the public
	RPKI, contains the needed public key.  The RPKI trust anchors
	for the RIRs are expected to already be available to the party
	performing signature validation.  Validation of the CMS
	signature over the geofeed file involves:
      </t>
      <ol spacing="normal" type="1" indent="adaptive" start="1" pn="section-5-14">
        <li pn="section-5-14.1" derivedCounter="1.">
	  Obtaining the signer's certificate from the CMS SignedData
	  CertificateSet <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/>.  The certificate
	  SubjectKeyIdentifier extension <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
	  match the SubjectKeyIdentifier in the CMS SignerInfo
	  SignerIdentifier <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/>.  If the key
	  identifiers do not match, then validation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail.
	</li>
        <li pn="section-5-14.2" derivedCounter="2.">
	  Validating the signer's certificate <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ensure that it is
	  part of the current <xref target="RFC9286" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9286"/> manifest and that
	  all resources are covered by the RPKI certificate.
	</li>
        <li pn="section-5-14.3" derivedCounter="3.">
	  Constructing the certification path for the signer's
	  certificate.  All of the needed certificates are expected to
	  be readily available in the RPKI repository.  The
	  certification path <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be valid according to the validation
	  algorithm in <xref target="RFC5280" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5280"/> and the additional
	  checks specified in <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/> associated with
	  the IP Address Delegation certificate extension and the
	  Autonomous System Identifier Delegation certificate extension.
	  If certification path validation is unsuccessful, then
	  validation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail.
	</li>
        <li pn="section-5-14.4" derivedCounter="4.">
	  Validating the CMS SignedData as specified in <xref target="RFC5652" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC5652"/> using the public key from the validated
	  signer's certificate.  If the signature validation is
	  unsuccessful, then validation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail.
	</li>
        <li pn="section-5-14.5" derivedCounter="5.">
	  Confirming that the eContentType object identifier (OID) is
	  id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1.47).  This
	  OID <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> appear within both the eContentType in the
	  encapContentInfo object and within the ContentType signed attribute
	  in the signerInfo object (see <xref target="RFC6488" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC6488"/>).
	</li>
        <li pn="section-5-14.6" derivedCounter="6.">
	  Verifying that the IP Address Delegation certificate
	  extension <xref target="RFC3779" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3779"/> covers all of the address
	  ranges of the geofeed file.  If all of the address ranges are
	  not covered, then validation <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> fail.
	</li>
      </ol>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-15">
	All of the above steps <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be successful to consider the
	geofeed file signature as valid.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-16">
	The authenticator <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be hidden as a series of "#" comments at the
	end of the geofeed file.  The following simple example is
	cryptographically incorrect:
      </t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-5-17">
    # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
    # MIIGlwYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGiDCCBoQCAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
    # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggSxMIIErTCCA5WgAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZu
    ...
    # imwYkXpiMxw44EZqDjl36MiWsRDLdgoijBBcGbibwyAfGeR46k5raZCGvxG+4xa
    # O8PDTxTfIYwAnBjRBKAqAZ7yX5xHfm58jUXsZJ7Ileq1S7G6Kk=
    # End Signature: 192.0.2.0 - 192.0.2.255
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-18">
	A correct and full example is in <xref target="example" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-19">
	The CMS signature does not cover the signature lines.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-5-20">
	The bracketing "# RPKI Signature:" and "# End Signature:" <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
	be present as shown in the example.  The RPKI Signature's IP
	address range <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> match that of the geofeed URL in the inetnum:
	that points to the geofeed file.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="ops" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-6">
      <name slugifiedName="name-operational-considerations">Operational Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-1">
        To create the needed inetnum: objects, an operator wishing to register
        the location of their geofeed file needs to coordinate with their
        Regional Internet Registry (RIR) or National Internet Registry (NIR)
        and/or any provider Local Internet Registry (LIR) that has assigned
        address ranges to them.  RIRs/NIRs provide means for assignees to
        create and maintain inetnum: objects.  They also provide means of
        assigning or sub-assigning IP address resources and allowing the
        assignee to create WHOIS data, including inetnum: objects, thereby
        referring to geofeed files.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-2">
        The geofeed files <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be published via and fetched using
        HTTPS <xref target="RFC9110" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9110"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-3">
        When using data from a geofeed file, one <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> ignore data
        outside the referring inetnum: object's inetnum: attribute
        address range.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-4">
        If and only if the geofeed file is not signed per <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>, then multiple inetnum: objects <bcp14>MAY</bcp14>
        refer to the same geofeed file, and the consumer <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        use only lines in the geofeed file where the prefix is covered by the
        address range of the inetnum: object's URL it has followed.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-5">
        If the geofeed file is signed, and the signer's certificate
        changes, the signature in the geofeed file <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
        be updated.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-6">
        It is good key hygiene to use a given key for only one purpose.
        To dedicate a signing private key for signing a geofeed file, an
        RPKI Certification Authority (CA) may issue a subordinate
        certificate exclusively for the purpose shown in <xref target="example" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Appendix A"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-7">
   Harvesting and publishing aggregated geofeed data outside of the RPSL
   model should be avoided as it could lead to detailed data
   of one aggregatee undesirably affecting the less detailed data of a
   different aggregatee. Moreover, publishing
        aggregated geofeed data prevents the reader of the data from
        performing the checks described in Sections <xref target="fetch" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="4"/> and <xref target="auth" format="counter" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="5"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-8">
        At the time of publishing this document, geolocation providers
        have bulk WHOIS data access at all the RIRs. An anonymized
        version of such data is openly available for all RIRs except
        ARIN, which requires an authorization.  However, for users
        without such authorization, the same result can be achieved with
        extra RDAP effort. There is open-source code to pass over such
        data across all RIRs, collect all geofeed references, and
        process them <xref target="GEOFEED-FINDER" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="GEOFEED-FINDER"/>.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-6-9">
        To prevent undue load on RPSL and geofeed servers,
        entity-fetching geofeed data using these mechanisms <bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14> do frequent real-time lookups.  <xref target="RFC8805" sectionFormat="of" section="3.4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8805#section-3.4" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> suggests use of the HTTP Expires header <xref target="RFC9111" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9111"/> to signal when geofeed data
        should be refetched. As the data change very infrequently, in
        the absence of such an HTTP Header signal, collectors
        <bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14> fetch more frequently than weekly.  It
        would be polite not to fetch at magic times such as midnight
        UTC, the first of the month, etc., because too many others are
        likely to do the same.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="privacy" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-7">
      <name slugifiedName="name-privacy-considerations">Privacy Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-7-1">
        <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> geofeed data may reveal the
        approximate location of an IP address, which might in turn reveal the
        approximate location of an individual user.  Unfortunately, <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> provides no privacy guidance on
        avoiding or ameliorating possible damage due to this exposure of the
        user.  In publishing pointers to geofeed files as described in this
        document, the operator should be aware of this exposure in geofeed
        data and be cautious.  All the privacy considerations of <xref target="RFC8805" sectionFormat="of" section="4" format="default" derivedLink="https://rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8805#section-4" derivedContent="RFC8805"/>
        apply to this document.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-7-2">
        Where <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/> provided the ability
        to publish location data, this document makes bulk access to those data
        readily available.  This is a goal, not an accident.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="impl" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-8">
      <name slugifiedName="name-implementation-status">Implementation Status</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-8-1">
        At the time of publishing this document, the geofeed: attribute
        in inetnum objects has been implemented in the RIPE and APNIC
        databases.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-8-2">
        Registrants in databases that do not yet support the geofeed:
        attribute are using the remarks: attribute, or equivalent.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-8-3">
        At the time of publishing this document, the registry data
        published by ARIN are not the same RPSL as that of the other
        registries (see <xref target="RFC7485" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC7485"/> for a
        survey of the WHOIS Tower of Babel). Therefore, when fetching
        from ARIN via FTP <xref target="RFC0959" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC0959"/>,
        WHOIS <xref target="RFC3912" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC3912"/>, the RDAP <xref target="RFC9082" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC9082"/>, etc., the "NetRange" attribute/key must be
        treated as "inetnum", and the "Comment" attribute must be
        treated as "remarks".
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-8-4">
        <xref target="rpki-client" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="rpki-client"/> can be used to authenticate a
        signed geofeed file.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="seccons" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-9">
      <name slugifiedName="name-security-considerations">Security Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-1">
        It is generally prudent for a consumer of geofeed data to also
        use other sources to cross-validate the data.  All the security
        considerations of <xref target="RFC8805" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="RFC8805"/>
        apply here as well.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-2">
        The consumer of geofeed data <bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14> fetch and process the data
        themselves.  Importing data sets produced and/or processed by a
        third-party places significant trust in the third-party.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-3">
        As mentioned in <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/>, some
        RPSL repositories have weak, if any, authentication.  This
        allows spoofing of inetnum: objects pointing to malicious
        geofeed files.  <xref target="auth" format="default" sectionFormat="of" derivedContent="Section 5"/> suggests
        an unfortunately complex method for stronger authentication
        based on the RPKI.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-4">
        For example, if an inetnum: for a wide address range (e.g., a
        /16) points to an RPKI-signed geofeed file, a customer or
        attacker could publish an unsigned equal or narrower (e.g., a
        /24) inetnum: in a WHOIS registry that has weak authorization,
        abusing the rule that the most-specific inetnum: object with a
        geofeed reference <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> be used.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-5">
        If signatures were mandatory, the above attack would be stymied, but
        of course that is not happening anytime soon.
      </t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-9-6">
        The RPSL providers have had to throttle fetching from their
        servers due to too-frequent queries.  Usually, they throttle by
        the querying IP address or block.  Similar defenses will likely
        need to be deployed by geofeed file servers.
      </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana" numbered="true" toc="include" removeInRFC="false" pn="section-10">
      <name slugifiedName="name-iana-considerations">IANA Considerations</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-10-1">
	In the SMI Security for S/MIME CMS Content Type
	(1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1) in the Structure of Management
	Information (SMI) Numbers (MIB Module Registrations) registry
	group (located at <eref target="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers/" brackets="angle"/>),
	the reference for this registration has been updated to this document:
      </t>
      <table anchor="IANA-registration" align="center" pn="table-1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-from-smi-security-for-s-mim">From SMI Security for S/MIME Module Identifier (1.2.840.113549.1.9.16.1)</name>
        <thead>
          <tr>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Decimal</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Description</th>
            <th align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">Reference</th>
          </tr>
        </thead>
        <tbody>
          <tr>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">47</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">id-ct-geofeedCSVwithCRLF</td>
            <td align="left" colspan="1" rowspan="1">RFC 9632</td>
          </tr>
        </tbody>
      </table>
    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <displayreference target="I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed" to="RDAP-GEOFEED"/>
    <references pn="section-11">
      <name slugifiedName="name-references">References</name>
      <references pn="section-11.1">
        <name slugifiedName="name-normative-references">Normative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner"/>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2622" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2622" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2622">
          <front>
            <title>Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL)</title>
            <author fullname="C. Alaettinoglu" initials="C." surname="Alaettinoglu"/>
            <author fullname="C. Villamizar" initials="C." surname="Villamizar"/>
            <author fullname="E. Gerich" initials="E." surname="Gerich"/>
            <author fullname="D. Kessens" initials="D." surname="Kessens"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <author fullname="T. Bates" initials="T." surname="Bates"/>
            <author fullname="D. Karrenberg" initials="D." surname="Karrenberg"/>
            <author fullname="M. Terpstra" initials="M." surname="Terpstra"/>
            <date month="June" year="1999"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">RPSL allows a network operator to be able to specify routing policies at various levels in the Internet hierarchy; for example at the Autonomous System (AS) level. At the same time, policies can be specified with sufficient detail in RPSL so that low level router configurations can be generated from them. RPSL is extensible; new routing protocols and new protocol features can be introduced at any time. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2622"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2622"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2725" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2725" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC2725">
          <front>
            <title>Routing Policy System Security</title>
            <author fullname="C. Villamizar" initials="C." surname="Villamizar"/>
            <author fullname="C. Alaettinoglu" initials="C." surname="Alaettinoglu"/>
            <author fullname="D. Meyer" initials="D." surname="Meyer"/>
            <author fullname="S. Murphy" initials="S." surname="Murphy"/>
            <date month="December" year="1999"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The implementation and deployment of a routing policy system must maintain some degree of integrity to be of any operational use. This document addresses the need to assure integrity of the data by providing an authentication and authorization model. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2725"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2725"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3629" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3629" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3629">
          <front>
            <title>UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646</title>
            <author fullname="F. Yergeau" initials="F." surname="Yergeau"/>
            <date month="November" year="2003"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">ISO/IEC 10646-1 defines a large character set called the Universal Character Set (UCS) which encompasses most of the world's writing systems. The originally proposed encodings of the UCS, however, were not compatible with many current applications and protocols, and this has led to the development of UTF-8, the object of this memo. UTF-8 has the characteristic of preserving the full US-ASCII range, providing compatibility with file systems, parsers and other software that rely on US-ASCII values but are transparent to other values. This memo obsoletes and replaces RFC 2279.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="63"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3629"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3629"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3779" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3779" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3779">
          <front>
            <title>X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers</title>
            <author fullname="C. Lynn" initials="C." surname="Lynn"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <author fullname="K. Seo" initials="K." surname="Seo"/>
            <date month="June" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines two X.509 v3 certificate extensions. The first binds a list of IP address blocks, or prefixes, to the subject of a certificate. The second binds a list of autonomous system identifiers to the subject of a certificate. These extensions may be used to convey the authorization of the subject to use the IP addresses and autonomous system identifiers contained in the extensions. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3779"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3779"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4012" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4012" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4012">
          <front>
            <title>Routing Policy Specification Language next generation (RPSLng)</title>
            <author fullname="L. Blunk" initials="L." surname="Blunk"/>
            <author fullname="J. Damas" initials="J." surname="Damas"/>
            <author fullname="F. Parent" initials="F." surname="Parent"/>
            <author fullname="A. Robachevsky" initials="A." surname="Robachevsky"/>
            <date month="March" year="2005"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo introduces a new set of simple extensions to the Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL), enabling the language to document routing policies for the IPv6 and multicast address families currently used in the Internet. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4012"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4012"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4648" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4648">
          <front>
            <title>The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings</title>
            <author fullname="S. Josefsson" initials="S." surname="Josefsson"/>
            <date month="October" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes the commonly used base 64, base 32, and base 16 encoding schemes. It also discusses the use of line-feeds in encoded data, use of padding in encoded data, use of non-alphabet characters in encoded data, use of different encoding alphabets, and canonical encodings. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4648"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4648"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper"/>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson"/>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell"/>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk"/>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet. An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction. The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms. Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined. A set of required certificate extensions is specified. The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions. An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described. An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5652" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5652" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5652">
          <front>
            <title>Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="September" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS). This syntax is used to digitally sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message content. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="70"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5652"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5652"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6481" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6481" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6481">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for Resource Certificate Repository Structure</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a profile for the structure of the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) distributed repository. Each individual repository publication point is a directory that contains files that correspond to X.509/PKIX Resource Certificates, Certificate Revocation Lists and signed objects. This profile defines the object (file) naming scheme, the contents of repository publication points (directories), and a suggested internal structure of a local repository cache that is intended to facilitate synchronization across a distributed collection of repository publication points and to facilitate certification path construction. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6481"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6481"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6487" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6487" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6487">
          <front>
            <title>A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates</title>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="G. Michaelson" initials="G." surname="Michaelson"/>
            <author fullname="R. Loomans" initials="R." surname="Loomans"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a standard profile for X.509 certificates for the purpose of supporting validation of assertions of "right-of-use" of Internet Number Resources (INRs). The certificates issued under this profile are used to convey the issuer's authorization of the subject to be regarded as the current holder of a "right-of-use" of the INRs that are described in the certificate. This document contains the normative specification of Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) syntax in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). This document also specifies profiles for the format of certificate requests and specifies the Relying Party RPKI certificate path validation procedure. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6487"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6487"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6488" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6488" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6488">
          <front>
            <title>Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <author fullname="A. Chi" initials="A." surname="Chi"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <date month="February" year="2012"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a generic profile for signed objects used in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). These RPKI signed objects make use of Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) as a standard encapsulation format. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6488"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6488"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba"/>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8805" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8805" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8805">
          <front>
            <title>A Format for Self-Published IP Geolocation Feeds</title>
            <author fullname="E. Kline" initials="E." surname="Kline"/>
            <author fullname="K. Duleba" initials="K." surname="Duleba"/>
            <author fullname="Z. Szamonek" initials="Z." surname="Szamonek"/>
            <author fullname="S. Moser" initials="S." surname="Moser"/>
            <author fullname="W. Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari"/>
            <date month="August" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document records a format whereby a network operator can publish a mapping of IP address prefixes to simplified geolocation information, colloquially termed a "geolocation feed". Interested parties can poll and parse these feeds to update or merge with other geolocation data sources and procedures. This format intentionally only allows specifying coarse-level location.</t>
              <t indent="0">Some technical organizations operating networks that move from one conference location to the next have already experimentally published small geolocation feeds.</t>
              <t indent="0">This document describes a currently deployed format. At least one consumer (Google) has incorporated these feeds into a geolocation data pipeline, and a significant number of ISPs are using it to inform them where their prefixes should be geolocated.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8805"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8805"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8933" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8933" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC8933">
          <front>
            <title>Update to the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) for Algorithm Identifier Protection</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="October" year="2020"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document updates the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) specified in RFC 5652 to ensure that algorithm identifiers in signed-data and authenticated-data content types are adequately protected.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8933"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8933"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9110" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9110">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Semantics</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document describes the overall architecture of HTTP, establishes common terminology, and defines aspects of the protocol that are shared by all versions. In this definition are core protocol elements, extensibility mechanisms, and the "http" and "https" Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) schemes.</t>
              <t indent="0">This document updates RFC 3864 and obsoletes RFCs 2818, 7231, 7232, 7233, 7235, 7538, 7615, 7694, and portions of 7230.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="97"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9110"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9110"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9286" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9286" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9286">
          <front>
            <title>Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)</title>
            <author fullname="R. Austein" initials="R." surname="Austein"/>
            <author fullname="G. Huston" initials="G." surname="Huston"/>
            <author fullname="S. Kent" initials="S." surname="Kent"/>
            <author fullname="M. Lepinski" initials="M." surname="Lepinski"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a "manifest" for use in the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI). A manifest is a signed object (file) that contains a listing of all the signed objects (files) in the repository publication point (directory) associated with an authority responsible for publishing in the repository. For each certificate, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), or other type of signed objects issued by the authority that are published at this repository publication point, the manifest contains both the name of the file containing the object and a hash of the file content. Manifests are intended to enable a relying party (RP) to detect certain forms of attacks against a repository. Specifically, if an RP checks a manifest's contents against the signed objects retrieved from a repository publication point, then the RP can detect replay attacks, and unauthorized in-flight modification or deletion of signed objects. This document obsoletes RFC 6486.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9286"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9286"/>
        </reference>
      </references>
      <references pn="section-11.2">
        <name slugifiedName="name-informative-references">Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="GEOFEED-FINDER" target="https://github.com/massimocandela/geofeed-finder" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="GEOFEED-FINDER">
          <front>
            <title>geofeed-finder</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true"/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="2024"/>
          </front>
          <refcontent>commit 5f557a4</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="INET6NUM" target="https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/RPSL-Object-Types/Descriptions-of-Primary-Objects/#description-of-the-inet6num-object" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="INET6NUM">
          <front>
            <title>RIPE Database Documentation: Description of the INET6NUM Object</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="INETNUM" target="https://apps.db.ripe.net/docs/RPSL-Object-Types/Descriptions-of-Primary-Objects/#description-of-the-inetnum-object" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="INETNUM">
          <front>
            <title>RIPE Database Documentation: Description of the INETNUM Object</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
            </author>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="I-D.ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed" target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed-07" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RDAP-GEOFEED">
          <front>
            <title>An RDAP Extension for Geofeed Data</title>
            <author fullname="Jasdip Singh"/>
            <author fullname="Tom Harrison"/>
            <date day="6" month="August" year="2024"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document defines a new Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP)
   extension, "geofeed1", for indicating that an RDAP server hosts
   geofeed URLs for its IP network objects.  It also defines a new media
   type and link relation type for the associated link objects included
   in responses.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-regext-rdap-geofeed-07"/>
          <refcontent>Work in Progress</refcontent>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC0959" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc959" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC0959">
          <front>
            <title>File Transfer Protocol</title>
            <author fullname="J. Postel" initials="J." surname="Postel"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reynolds" initials="J." surname="Reynolds"/>
            <date month="October" year="1985"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo is the official specification of the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for the DARPA Internet community. The primary intent is to clarify and correct the documentation of the FTP specification, not to change the protocol. The following new optional commands are included in this edition of the specification: Change to Parent Directory (CDUP), Structure Mount (SMNT), Store Unique (STOU), Remove Directory (RMD), Make Directory (MKD), Print Directory (PWD), and System (SYST). Note that this specification is compatible with the previous edition.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="9"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="959"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC0959"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC3912" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3912" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC3912">
          <front>
            <title>WHOIS Protocol Specification</title>
            <author fullname="L. Daigle" initials="L." surname="Daigle"/>
            <date month="September" year="2004"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document updates the specification of the WHOIS protocol, thereby obsoleting RFC 954. The update is intended to remove the material from RFC 954 that does not have to do with the on-the-wire protocol, and is no longer applicable in today's Internet. This document does not attempt to change or update the protocol per se, or document other uses of the protocol that have come into existence since the publication of RFC 954. [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="3912"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC3912"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC4632" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4632" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC4632">
          <front>
            <title>Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR): The Internet Address Assignment and Aggregation Plan</title>
            <author fullname="V. Fuller" initials="V." surname="Fuller"/>
            <author fullname="T. Li" initials="T." surname="Li"/>
            <date month="August" year="2006"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This memo discusses the strategy for address assignment of the existing 32-bit IPv4 address space with a view toward conserving the address space and limiting the growth rate of global routing state. This document obsoletes the original Classless Inter-domain Routing (CIDR) spec in RFC 1519, with changes made both to clarify the concepts it introduced and, after more than twelve years, to update the Internet community on the results of deploying the technology described. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="122"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="4632"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC4632"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5485" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5485" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC5485">
          <front>
            <title>Digital Signatures on Internet-Draft Documents</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="March" year="2009"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies the conventions for digital signatures on Internet-Drafts. The Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) is used to create a detached signature, which is stored in a separate companion file so that no existing utilities are impacted by the addition of the digital signature. This memo provides information for the Internet community.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5485"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5485"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC6269" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC6269">
          <front>
            <title>Issues with IP Address Sharing</title>
            <author fullname="M. Ford" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Ford"/>
            <author fullname="M. Boucadair" initials="M." surname="Boucadair"/>
            <author fullname="A. Durand" initials="A." surname="Durand"/>
            <author fullname="P. Levis" initials="P." surname="Levis"/>
            <author fullname="P. Roberts" initials="P." surname="Roberts"/>
            <date month="June" year="2011"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The completion of IPv4 address allocations from IANA and the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) is causing service providers around the world to question how they will continue providing IPv4 connectivity service to their subscribers when there are no longer sufficient IPv4 addresses to allocate them one per subscriber. Several possible solutions to this problem are now emerging based around the idea of shared IPv4 addressing. These solutions give rise to a number of issues, and this memo identifies those common to all such address sharing approaches. Such issues include application failures, additional service monitoring complexity, new security vulnerabilities, and so on. Solution-specific discussions are out of scope.</t>
              <t indent="0">Deploying IPv6 is the only perennial way to ease pressure on the public IPv4 address pool without the need for address sharing mechanisms that give rise to the issues identified herein. This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is published for informational purposes.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="6269"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC6269"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7485" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7485" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7485">
          <front>
            <title>Inventory and Analysis of WHOIS Registration Objects</title>
            <author fullname="L. Zhou" initials="L." surname="Zhou"/>
            <author fullname="N. Kong" initials="N." surname="Kong"/>
            <author fullname="S. Shen" initials="S." surname="Shen"/>
            <author fullname="S. Sheng" initials="S." surname="Sheng"/>
            <author fullname="A. Servin" initials="A." surname="Servin"/>
            <date month="March" year="2015"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">WHOIS output objects from registries, including both Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and Domain Name Registries (DNRs), were collected and analyzed. This document describes the process and results of the statistical analysis of existing WHOIS information. The purpose of this document is to build an object inventory to facilitate discussions of data objects included in Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) responses.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7485"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7485"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC7909" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7909" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC7909">
          <front>
            <title>Securing Routing Policy Specification Language (RPSL) Objects with Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Signatures</title>
            <author fullname="R. Kisteleki" initials="R." surname="Kisteleki"/>
            <author fullname="B. Haberman" initials="B." surname="Haberman"/>
            <date month="June" year="2016"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes a method that allows parties to electronically sign Routing Policy Specification Language objects and validate such electronic signatures. This allows relying parties to detect accidental or malicious modifications of such objects. It also allows parties who run Internet Routing Registries or similar databases, but do not yet have authentication (based on Routing Policy System Security) of the maintainers of certain objects, to verify that the additions or modifications of such database objects are done by the legitimate holder(s) of the Internet resources mentioned in those objects. This document updates RFCs 2622 and 4012 to add the signature attribute to supported RPSL objects.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7909"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7909"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9082" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9082" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9082">
          <front>
            <title>Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP) Query Format</title>
            <author fullname="S. Hollenbeck" initials="S." surname="Hollenbeck"/>
            <author fullname="A. Newton" initials="A." surname="Newton"/>
            <date month="June" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document describes uniform patterns to construct HTTP URLs that may be used to retrieve registration information from registries (including both Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) and Domain Name Registries (DNRs)) using "RESTful" web access patterns. These uniform patterns define the query syntax for the Registration Data Access Protocol (RDAP). This document obsoletes RFC 7482.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="95"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9082"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9082"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9092" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9092" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9092">
          <front>
            <title>Finding and Using Geofeed Data</title>
            <author fullname="R. Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush"/>
            <author fullname="M. Candela" initials="M." surname="Candela"/>
            <author fullname="W. Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari"/>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley"/>
            <date month="July" year="2021"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">This document specifies how to augment the Routing Policy Specification Language inetnum: class to refer specifically to geofeed data comma-separated values (CSV) files and describes an optional scheme that uses the Routing Public Key Infrastructure to authenticate the geofeed data CSV files.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9092"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9092"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC9111" target="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9111" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RFC9111">
          <front>
            <title>HTTP Caching</title>
            <author fullname="R. Fielding" initials="R." role="editor" surname="Fielding"/>
            <author fullname="M. Nottingham" initials="M." role="editor" surname="Nottingham"/>
            <author fullname="J. Reschke" initials="J." role="editor" surname="Reschke"/>
            <date month="June" year="2022"/>
            <abstract>
              <t indent="0">The Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is a stateless application-level protocol for distributed, collaborative, hypertext information systems. This document defines HTTP caches and the associated header fields that control cache behavior or indicate cacheable response messages.</t>
              <t indent="0">This document obsoletes RFC 7234.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="STD" value="98"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="9111"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC9111"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RIPE-DB" target="https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/db/support/documentation/ripe-database-documentation" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RIPE-DB">
          <front>
            <title>RIPE Database Documentation</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RIPE181" target="https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-181" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RIPE181">
          <front>
            <title>Representation Of IP Routing Policies In A Routing Registry</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="October" year="1994"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RIPE81" target="https://www.ripe.net/publications/docs/ripe-081" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="RIPE81">
          <front>
            <title>Representation Of IP Routing Policies In The RIPE Database</title>
            <author>
              <organization showOnFrontPage="true">RIPE NCC</organization>
            </author>
            <date month="February" year="1993"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="rpki-client" target="https://sobornost.net/~job/using_geofeed_authenticators.txt" quoteTitle="true" derivedAnchor="rpki-client">
          <front>
            <title>Example on how to use rpki-client to authenticate a signed Geofeed</title>
            <author fullname="Job Snijders"/>
            <date month="September" year="2023"/>
          </front>
        </reference>
      </references>
    </references>
    <section anchor="example" numbered="true" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.a">
      <name slugifiedName="name-example">Example</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-1">This appendix provides an example, including a trust anchor, a
      Certificate Revocation List (CRL) signed by the trust anchor, a CA
      certificate subordinate to the trust anchor, a CRL signed by the CA, an
      end entity certificate subordinate to the CA for signing the geofeed,
      and a detached signature.</t>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-2">The trust anchor is represented by a self-signed certificate.  As
      usual in the RPKI, the trust anchor has authority over all IPv4 address
      blocks, all IPv6 address blocks, and all Autonomous System (AS)
      numbers.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-3">
   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIEQTCCAymgAwIBAgIUEggycNoFVRjAuN/Fw7URu0DEZNAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MTkyMDMzMzlaFw0zMzA5
   MTYyMDMzMzlaMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEB
   AQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQDQprR+g/i4JyObVURTp1JpGM23vGPyE5fDKFPqV7rw
   M1Amm7cnew66U02IzV0X5oiv5nSGfRX5UxsbR+vwPBMceQyDgS5lexFiv4fB/Vjf
   DT2qX/UjsLL9QOeaSOh7ToJSLjmtpa0D9iz7ful3hdxRjpMMZiE/reX9/ymdpW/E
   dg0F6+T9WGZE1miPeIjl5OZwnmLHCftkN/aaYk1iPNjNniHYIOjC1jSpABmoZyTj
   sgrwLE2F1fIRkVkwASqToq/D5v9voXaYYaXUNJb4H/5wenRuvT5O/n6PXh70rMQy
   F5yzLs96ytxqg5gGX9kabVnvxFU8nHfPa0rhlwfTJnljAgMBAAGjggGHMIIBgzAd
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   KwYBBQUHMAqGMnJzeW5jOi8vcnBraS5leGFtcGxlLm5ldC9yZXBvc2l0b3J5L2V4
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   AwEAMAkEAgACMAMDAQAwIQYIKwYBBQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgEAAgUA////
   /zANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAa9eLY9QAmnlZOIyOzbpta5wqcOUQV/yR7o/0
   1zkEZaSavKBt19lMK6AXZurx1T5jyjIwG7bEtZZThjtH2m80V5kc2tsFjSq/yp7N
   JBclMHVd3tXse9If3nXYF4bxRIcir1lXlAbYN+Eo1U3i5qJO+fxouzt7Merk2Dih
   nsenTeXKzN7tfmuCYZZHCC8viCoJWdH+o1uRM4TiQApZsUJ8sF4TABrrRJmA/Ed5
   v0CTBbgqTx7yg0+VarFLPdnjYgtpoCJqwE2C1UpX15rZSaLVuGXtbwXd/cHEg5vF
   W6QTsMeMQFEUa6hkicDGtxLTUdhckBgmCGoF2nlZii5f1BTWAg==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-4">The CRL is issued by the trust anchor.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-5">
   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBjjB4AgEBMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAMBUxEzARBgNVBAMTCmV4YW1wbGUtdGEX
   DTIzMDkyMzE1NTUzOFoXDTIzMTAyMzE1NTUzOFqgLzAtMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFMC9
   Ul2+0niyFuyzo0OV0gYLmQgyMAoGA1UdFAQDAgEEMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBCwUAA4IB
   AQCngOu+Nq3WC4y/pHtLoheAOtNg32WWsKPNiEyL+QalmOtURUsWMzOq41bmoPzQ
   NDQoRmXe9mvohAVRe0CnM7A07HOtSfjw5aoouPXGTtfwEomHG2CYk+2U1bvxgZyA
   E1c5TvyhkabFMO0+857wqxRP+ht9NV0lMX6kUFlEOCw3ELVd9oNNRBwKQtXj1huM
   6Sf26va2a1tnC5zP01hN+EY3S9T5T1gcgPGBcqRWKoXJEbRzCrLsb/TMj5cMpIje
   AHZoBojVAmvL1AIH/BnGAQj0+XqaJ0axHvlqJa8iX8QwKqhp+o6sv/atY2QDDRmE
   Yjq/VrBVKu5VsDY2Lr29HszA
   -----END X509 CRL-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-6">
   The CA certificate is issued by the trust anchor.  This
   certificate grants authority over one IPv4 address block
   (192.0.2.0/24) and two AS numbers (64496 and 64497).</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-7">
   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIE7DCCA9SgAwIBAgIUcyCzS10hdfG65kbRq7toQAvRDLkwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKZXhhbXBsZS10YTAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA5
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   b3NpdG9yeS8wHwYIKwYBBQUHAQcBAf8EEDAOMAwEAgABMAYDBADAAAIwIQYIKwYB
   BQUHAQgBAf8EEjAQoA4wDDAKAgMA+/ACAwD78TANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEA
   arIrZWb22wFmP+hVjhdg3IsKHB6fQdMuUR0u2DyZTVvbL6C+HyGAH32pi5mR/QLX
   FAfdqALaB7r68tQTGLIW6bGljT+BqUPJmZcj56x3cBLJlltxwFatTloypjFt3cls
   xFCuuD9J2iBxc6odTKi6u0mhQjD+C9m4xkbe8XXWWx85IHm1s6rYbpGgiMWxBC80
   qqAzmBHGROWKUEvh00EYIYdiAvyFcrj7QtDiRJL5TDOySVd9pWJkerDzhqwE1IaZ
   rpHck+lkYTS7jTD++6v32HG62GdsmryOQUk3aU1rLb3kS8vzaGbrgHpGPid0Hd0x
   ZSl1AoIMpp5mZ7/h9aW5+A==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-8">
   The CRL is issued by the CA.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-9">
   -----BEGIN X509 CRL-----
   MIIBrTCBlgIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFADAzMTEwLwYDVQQDEygzQUNFMkNFRjRG
   QjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0y
   MzEwMjMxNTU1MzhaoC8wLTAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQ6zizvT7IbfRHj4YTvweKXs3eG
   QjAKBgNVHRQEAwIBATANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEACwCNzcAoqbMcUL1kBY65
   YhL95OnBqAcuc99pD4i9c1BmVOl7bXU3cJqLaOZ6Z8CmN0kBbcHyqlHBJ9oA/aYD
   ByhxsjzKk7jxtM2IlTpEvCEqvnGLSVihgS3h0NA+sgWqHGL3Rhcj6hVsi+j9GENc
   T6F9np1mxbI3i2xhgeDJG1pryvH0hWXh7yJiYS8ItNEaIIXDT3szK/J9wnPjukTR
   5MITiK9P3TCFujawb3O7rIT5PPgkM6eiCdwDgt6gjmw6cow5+rMjNHSRa+GOviSd
   gXljVDfJvF4tKHmw59Jc2aFnSGfX1/ITDNiNfXYpUYFOcsqxkYf8F0uO7AtbRmTF
   2w==
   -----END X509 CRL-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-10">
   The end entity certificate is issued by the CA.  This
   certificate grants signature authority for one IPv4 address block
   (192.0.2.0/24).  Signature authority for AS numbers is not needed
   for geofeed data signatures, so no AS numbers are included in the
   end entity certificate.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-11">
   -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
   MIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZvAwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQEL
   BQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdC
   Mzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkxNTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNV
   BAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEi
   MA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycTQrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEW
   yii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQgtPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0c
   K0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZmr5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upm
   BXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXhaFLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQp
   tmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKGzqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEog
   qtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMB
   AAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71RwUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0j
   BBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkIwDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1Ud
   IAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9y
   cGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvcnkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNF
   MTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmwwbAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUF
   BzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXBsZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNF
   RjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRTI5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcB
   BwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAAjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUe
   e0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131g
   MdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8suq6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdG
   lXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQC8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yi
   s6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQgDchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IW
   Ucv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg
   8fK1fd/f6fjZ9w==
   -----END CERTIFICATE-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-12">
   The end entity certificate is displayed below in detail.  For
   brevity, the other two certificates are not.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-13">
      0 1110: SEQUENCE {
      4  830:  SEQUENCE {
      8    3:   [0] {
     10    1:    INTEGER 2
            :     }
     13   20:   INTEGER
            :    27 AD 39 40 83 D7 F2 B5 B9 9B 86 70 C7 75 B2 B9
            :    6E E1 66 F0
     35   13:   SEQUENCE {
     37    9:    OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :     sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
     48    0:    NULL
            :     }
     50   51:   SEQUENCE {
     52   49:    SET {
     54   47:     SEQUENCE {
     56    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
     61   40:      PrintableString
            :       '3ACE2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    103   30:   SEQUENCE {
    105   13:    UTCTime 23/09/2023 15:55:38 GMT
    120   13:    UTCTime 19/07/2024 15:55:38 GMT
            :     }
    135   51:   SEQUENCE {
    137   49:    SET {
    139   47:     SEQUENCE {
    141    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3)
    146   40:      PrintableString
            :       '914652A3BD51C144260198889F5C45ABF053A187'
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    188  290:   SEQUENCE {
    192   13:    SEQUENCE {
    194    9:     OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :      rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1)
    205    0:     NULL
            :      }
    207  271:    BIT STRING, encapsulates {
    212  266:     SEQUENCE {
    216  257:      INTEGER
            :      00 B2 71 34 2B 39 BF EA 07 65 B7 8B 72 A2 F0 F8
            :      40 FC 31 16 CA 28 B6 4E 01 A8 F6 98 02 C0 EF 65
            :      B0 84 48 E9 96 FF 93 E6 92 89 65 8F F6 44 9C CE
            :      57 10 82 D3 C2 57 0A FA DA 14 D0 64 22 28 C0 13
            :      74 04 BD 1C 2B 4F F9 93 58 A6 25 D8 B9 A9 D3 37
            :      9E F2 AC C0 CF 02 9E 84 75 D6 F0 7C A5 01 70 AE
            :      E6 66 AF 9C 69 85 74 6F 13 E9 B3 B8 95 4B 82 ED
            :      95 D6 EA 66 05 7B 96 96 87 B2 9A E7 61 E9 65 89
            :      F8 60 E3 C0 F5 CE DD 18 97 05 E8 C1 AC E1 4D 5E
            :      16 85 2D ED 3C CB 80 CF 7E BF D2 FE D5 C9 38 19
            :      BB 43 34 29 B6 66 CF 2D 8B 46 7E 9A D8 BB 8E 65
            :      88 51 6A A8 FF 78 51 E2 E9 21 27 D7 77 7E 80 28
            :      6C EA 4C 50 9C 73 71 16 F6 5E 54 14 4D 4C 14 B9
            :      67 A0 4A 20 AA DA 0B A0 A0 01 B7 42 24 38 51 8A
            :      78 2F C4 81 E6 81 75 62 DE E3 AF 5D 74 2F 6B 41
            :      FB 79 C3 A8 3A 72 6C 46 F9 A6 03 74 81 01 DF 8C
            :      EB
    477    3:      INTEGER 65537
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
    482  352:   [3] {
    486  348:    SEQUENCE {
    490   29:     SEQUENCE {
    492    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14)
    497   22:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    499   20:       OCTET STRING
            :      91 46 52 A3 BD 51 C1 44 26 01 98 88 9F 5C 45 AB
            :      F0 53 A1 87
            :        }
            :       }
    521   31:     SEQUENCE {
    523    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35)
    528   24:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    530   22:       SEQUENCE {
    532   20:        [0]
            :      3A CE 2C EF 4F B2 1B 7D 11 E3 E1 84 EF C1 E2 97
            :      B3 77 86 42
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    554   14:     SEQUENCE {
    556    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15)
    561    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    564    4:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    566    2:       BIT STRING 7 unused bits
            :        '1'B (bit 0)
            :        }
            :       }
    570   24:     SEQUENCE {
    572    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32)
    577    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    580   14:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    582   12:       SEQUENCE {
    584   10:        SEQUENCE {
    586    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :          resourceCertificatePolicy (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 14 2)
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    596   97:     SEQUENCE {
    598    3:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31)
    603   90:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    605   88:       SEQUENCE {
    607   86:        SEQUENCE {
    609   84:         [0] {
    611   82:          [0] {
    613   80:           [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.crl'
            :            }
            :           }
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    695  108:     SEQUENCE {
    697    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1)
    707   96:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    709   94:       SEQUENCE {
    711   92:        SEQUENCE {
    713    8:         OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :          caIssuers (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 48 2)
    723   80:         [6]
            :          'rsync://rpki.example.net/repository/3ACE'
            :          '2CEF4FB21B7D11E3E184EFC1E297B3778642.cer'
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
    805   31:     SEQUENCE {
    807    8:      OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :       ipAddrBlocks (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 7)
    817    1:      BOOLEAN TRUE
    820   16:      OCTET STRING, encapsulates {
    822   14:       SEQUENCE {
    824   12:        SEQUENCE {
    826    2:         OCTET STRING 00 01
    830    6:         SEQUENCE {
    832    4:          BIT STRING
            :           '010000000000000000000011'B
            :           }
            :          }
            :         }
            :        }
            :       }
            :      }
            :     }
            :    }
    838   13:  SEQUENCE {
    840    9:   OBJECT IDENTIFIER
            :    sha256WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 11)
    851    0:   NULL
            :    }
    853  257:  BIT STRING
            :   97 1B 76 E4 55 1E 7B 4F AE 0A 27 53 1F EE 29 EC
            :   0B 77 BB 69 DC 80 77 06 4E C6 A0 DD 47 28 3E 37
            :   04 FC 8D 49 81 02 51 BB D4 E2 33 88 8D 07 50 BB
            :   2D B7 5D D7 7D 60 31 D9 62 2F 91 90 DC FE 10 7C
            :   A9 DF 92 E3 D1 E9 2D 55 F2 CB AA E9 94 F5 29 04
            :   72 2C 9C 7E 10 F8 03 37 6A DB FE 28 E2 D1 33 8A
            :   E9 12 8F 34 17 46 95 75 4B 8E D8 78 C7 FB AE D4
            :   EE 15 E7 81 8B 12 10 C0 3D 00 BC 21 49 B9 8A 7B
            :   4B FC 7C 75 33 5C 76 A6 D3 7F FA 3E 47 0F 75 D4
            :   5D DD F1 D7 7C A2 B3 AB BB E7 C9 DB 03 B3 43 E3
            :   42 4D 84 61 B9 24 D1 90 80 37 21 2F 82 10 CC 88
            :   72 94 C3 42 F9 B2 94 8B 2C 8C 1F 3D CC AA 85 40
            :   92 52 01 F3 A2 16 51 CB FB D8 C7 A4 AB E8 B8 E9
            :   3F F0 DD 19 DA 1A 7E 31 ED 10 09 72 D5 49 5B 0D
            :   DE E5 83 2B 16 74 1C BA E6 86 3A CD 10 72 8C 56
            :   EC 18 B8 5B B1 20 F1 F2 B5 7D DF DF E9 F8 D9 F7
            :   }
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-14">
   To allow reproduction of the signature results, the end entity
   private key is provided.  For brevity, the other two private
   keys are not.</t>
      <sourcecode type="" markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-15">
   -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
   MIIEpQIBAAKCAQEAsnE0Kzm/6gdlt4tyovD4QPwxFsootk4BqPaYAsDvZbCESOmW
   /5Pmkollj/ZEnM5XEILTwlcK+toU0GQiKMATdAS9HCtP+ZNYpiXYuanTN57yrMDP
   Ap6EddbwfKUBcK7mZq+caYV0bxPps7iVS4LtldbqZgV7lpaHsprnYellifhg48D1
   zt0YlwXowazhTV4WhS3tPMuAz36/0v7VyTgZu0M0KbZmzy2LRn6a2LuOZYhRaqj/
   eFHi6SEn13d+gChs6kxQnHNxFvZeVBRNTBS5Z6BKIKraC6CgAbdCJDhRingvxIHm
   gXVi3uOvXXQva0H7ecOoOnJsRvmmA3SBAd+M6wIDAQABAoIBAQCyB0FeMuKm8bRo
   18aKjFGSPEoZi53srIz5bvUgIi92TBLez7ZnzL6Iym26oJ+5th+lCHGO/dqlhXio
   pI50C5Yc9TFbblb/ECOsuCuuqKFjZ8CD3GVsHozXKJeMM+/o5YZXQrORj6UnwT0z
   ol/JE5pIGUCIgsXX6tz9s5BP3lUAvVQHsv6+vEVKLxQ3wj/1vIL8O/CN036EV0GJ
   mpkwmygPjfECT9wbWo0yn3jxJb36+M/QjjUP28oNIVn/IKoPZRXnqchEbuuCJ651
   IsaFSqtiThm4WZtvCH/IDq+6/dcMucmTjIRcYwW7fdHfjplllVPve9c/OmpWEQvF
   t3ArWUt5AoGBANs4764yHxo4mctLIE7G7l/tf9bP4KKUiYw4R4ByEocuqMC4yhmt
   MPCfOFLOQet71OWCkjP2L/7EKUe9yx7G5KmxAHY6jOjvcRkvGsl6lWFOsQ8p126M
   Y9hmGzMOjtsdhAiMmOWKzjvm4WqfMgghQe+PnjjSVkgTt+7BxpIuGBAvAoGBANBg
   26FF5cDLpixOd3Za1YXsOgguwCaw3Plvi7vUZRpa/zBMELEtyOebfakkIRWNm07l
   nE+lAZwxm+29PTD0nqCFE91teyzjnQaLO5kkAdJiFuVV3icLOGo399FrnJbKensm
   FGSli+3KxQhCNIJJfgWzq4bE0ioAMjdGbYXzIYQFAoGBAM6tuDJ36KDU+hIS6wu6
   O2TPSfZhF/zPo3pCWQ78/QDb+Zdw4IEiqoBA7F4NPVLg9Y/H8UTx9r/veqe7hPOo
   Ok7NpIzSmKTHkc5XfZ60Zn9OLFoKbaQ40a1kXoJdWEu2YROaUlAe9F6/Rog6PHYz
   vLE5qscRbu0XQhLkN+z7bg5bAoGBAKDsbDEb/dbqbyaAYpmwhH2sdRSkphg7Niwc
   DNm9qWa1J6Zw1+M87I6Q8naRREuU1IAVqqWHVLr/ROBQ6NTJ1Uc5/qFeT2XXUgkf
   taMKv61tuyjZK3sTmznMh0HfzUpWjEhWnCEuB+ZYVdmO52ZGw2A75RdrILL2+9Dc
   PvDXVubRAoGAdqXeSWoLxuzZXzl8rsaKrQsTYaXnOWaZieU1SL5vVe8nK257UDqZ
   E3ng2j5XPTUWli+aNGFEJGRoNtcQvO60O/sFZUhu52sqq9mWVYZNh1TB5aP8X+pV
   iFcZOLUvQEcN6PA+YQK5FU11rAI1M0Gm5RDnVnUl0L2xfCYxb7FzV6Y=
   -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
</sourcecode>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.a-16">
   The signing of "192.0.2.0/24,US,WA,Seattle," (terminated by CR and LF)
   yields the following detached CMS signature.</t>
      <sourcecode markers="false" pn="section-appendix.a-17">
   # RPKI Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
   # MIIGQAYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIGMTCCBi0CAQMxDTALBglghkgBZQMEAgEwDQYLKoZ
   # IhvcNAQkQAS+gggRaMIIEVjCCAz6gAwIBAgIUJ605QIPX8rW5m4Zwx3WyuW7hZv
   # AwDQYJKoZIhvcNAQELBQAwMzExMC8GA1UEAxMoM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExR
   # TNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0MjAeFw0yMzA5MjMxNTU1MzhaFw0yNDA3MTkx
   # NTU1MzhaMDMxMTAvBgNVBAMTKDkxNDY1MkEzQkQ1MUMxNDQyNjAxOTg4ODlGNUM
   # 0NUFCRjA1M0ExODcwggEiMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUAA4IBDwAwggEKAoIBAQCycT
   # QrOb/qB2W3i3Ki8PhA/DEWyii2TgGo9pgCwO9lsIRI6Zb/k+aSiWWP9kSczlcQg
   # tPCVwr62hTQZCIowBN0BL0cK0/5k1imJdi5qdM3nvKswM8CnoR11vB8pQFwruZm
   # r5xphXRvE+mzuJVLgu2V1upmBXuWloeymudh6WWJ+GDjwPXO3RiXBejBrOFNXha
   # FLe08y4DPfr/S/tXJOBm7QzQptmbPLYtGfprYu45liFFqqP94UeLpISfXd36AKG
   # zqTFCcc3EW9l5UFE1MFLlnoEogqtoLoKABt0IkOFGKeC/EgeaBdWLe469ddC9rQ
   # ft5w6g6cmxG+aYDdIEB34zrAgMBAAGjggFgMIIBXDAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUkUZSo71R
   # wUQmAZiIn1xFq/BToYcwHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUOs4s70+yG30R4+GE78Hil7N3hkI
   # wDgYDVR0PAQH/BAQDAgeAMBgGA1UdIAEB/wQOMAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHDgIwYQYDVR
   # 0fBFowWDBWoFSgUoZQcnN5bmM6Ly9ycGtpLmV4YW1wbGUubmV0L3JlcG9zaXRvc
   # nkvM0FDRTJDRUY0RkIyMUI3RDExRTNFMTg0RUZDMUUyOTdCMzc3ODY0Mi5jcmww
   # bAYIKwYBBQUHAQEEYDBeMFwGCCsGAQUFBzAChlByc3luYzovL3Jwa2kuZXhhbXB
   # sZS5uZXQvcmVwb3NpdG9yeS8zQUNFMkNFRjRGQjIxQjdEMTFFM0UxODRFRkMxRT
   # I5N0IzNzc4NjQyLmNlcjAfBggrBgEFBQcBBwEB/wQQMA4wDAQCAAEwBgMEAMAAA
   # jANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQsFAAOCAQEAlxt25FUee0+uCidTH+4p7At3u2ncgHcGTsag
   # 3UcoPjcE/I1JgQJRu9TiM4iNB1C7Lbdd131gMdliL5GQ3P4QfKnfkuPR6S1V8su
   # q6ZT1KQRyLJx+EPgDN2rb/iji0TOK6RKPNBdGlXVLjth4x/uu1O4V54GLEhDAPQ
   # C8IUm5intL/Hx1M1x2ptN/+j5HD3XUXd3x13yis6u758nbA7ND40JNhGG5JNGQg
   # DchL4IQzIhylMNC+bKUiyyMHz3MqoVAklIB86IWUcv72Mekq+i46T/w3RnaGn4x
   # 7RAJctVJWw3e5YMrFnQcuuaGOs0QcoxW7Bi4W7Eg8fK1fd/f6fjZ9zGCAaowggG
   # mAgEDgBSRRlKjvVHBRCYBmIifXEWr8FOhhzALBglghkgBZQMEAgGgazAaBgkqhk
   # iG9w0BCQMxDQYLKoZIhvcNAQkQAS8wHAYJKoZIhvcNAQkFMQ8XDTIzMDkyMzE1N
   # TUzOFowLwYJKoZIhvcNAQkEMSIEICvi8p5S8ckg2wTRhDBQzGijjyqs5T6I+4Vt
   # BHypfcEWMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAKZND7pKdVdfpB6zaJN89wTt+sXd0io
   # 0WULMc+o6gRJFt3wmKNW2nYPrDbocJ+Q/rDMGxbp4QetJ0MQtn1+AYAS8v5jPDO
   # 4a63U4/mJ2D3wSnQsDP0lUVknqRzfnS66HgHqiOVdHB0U+OnMEJuqHNTLx0dknb
   # L3zwxyDJTHdo+dMB0U9xdcjwpsPM3xqg57EXj5EIQK5JbardXCjrsysAnEdktUY
   # oyayGNbbQelANYJcOmuHhSXArR+qqzvNP2MDRqqKEcpd65YW6FSnqlVMIBH2M3P
   # D2F0p3sdm4IeGAZWaERVB4AXO1PUFDNdhamr4XpIwqIoAig7xiLm7j8qu5Oc=
   # End Signature: 192.0.2.0/24
</sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section anchor="acks" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.b">
      <name slugifiedName="name-acknowledgments">Acknowledgments</name>
      <t indent="0" pn="section-appendix.b-1">Thanks to <contact fullname="Rob Austein"/> for the CMS and detached
      signature clue, <contact fullname="George Michaelson"/> for the first
      and substantial external review, and <contact fullname="Erik Kline"/>
      who was too shy to agree to coauthorship.  Additionally, we express our
      gratitude to early implementors, including <contact fullname="Menno       Schepers"/>, <contact fullname="Flavio Luciani"/>, <contact fullname="Eric Dugas"/>, and <contact fullname="Kevin Pack"/>.  Also,
      thanks to the following geolocation providers who are consuming geofeeds
      with this described solution: <contact fullname="Jonathan Kosgei       (ipdata.co)"/>, <contact fullname="Ben Dowling"/> (ipinfo.io), and
      <contact fullname="Pol Nisenblat"/> (bigdatacloud.com).  For an amazing
      number of helpful reviews, we thank <contact fullname="Job Snijders"/>,
      who also found an ASN.1 'inherit' issue, <contact fullname="Adrian       Farrel"/>, <contact fullname="Antonio Prado"/>, <contact fullname="Francesca Palombini"/>, <contact fullname="Jean-Michel Combes       (INTDIR)"/>, <contact fullname="John Scudder"/>, <contact fullname="Kyle       Rose (SECDIR)"/>, <contact fullname="Martin Duke"/>, <contact fullname="Mohamed Boucadair"/>, <contact fullname="Murray Kucherawy"/>,
      <contact fullname="Paul Kyzivat (GENART)"/>, <contact fullname="Rob       Wilton"/>, <contact fullname="Roman Danyliw"/>, and <contact fullname="Ties de Kock"/>.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="authors-addresses" numbered="false" removeInRFC="false" toc="include" pn="section-appendix.c">
      <name slugifiedName="name-authors-addresses">Authors' Addresses</name>
      <author fullname="Randy Bush" initials="R." surname="Bush">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">IIJ Research &amp; Arrcus</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street>5147 Crystal Springs</street>
            <city>Bainbridge Island</city>
            <region>Washington</region>
            <code>98110</code>
            <country>United States of America</country>
          </postal>
          <email>randy@psg.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Massimo Candela" initials="M." surname="Candela">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">NTT</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street>Veemweg 23</street>
            <city>Barneveld</city>
            <code>3771 MT</code>
            <country>Netherlands</country>
          </postal>
          <email>massimo@ntt.net</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Warren Kumari" initials="W." surname="Kumari">
        <organization showOnFrontPage="true">Google</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street>1600 Amphitheatre Parkway</street>
            <city>Mountain View</city>
            <region>CA</region>
            <code>94043</code>
            <country>United States of America</country>
          </postal>
          <email>warren@kumari.net</email>
        </address>
      </author>
      <author fullname="Russ Housley" initials="R" surname="Housley">
        <organization abbrev="Vigil Security" showOnFrontPage="true">Vigil Security, LLC</organization>
        <address>
          <postal>
            <street>516 Dranesville Road</street>
            <city>Herndon</city>
            <region>VA</region>
            <code>20170</code>
            <country>United States of America</country>
          </postal>
          <email>housley@vigilsec.com</email>
        </address>
      </author>
    </section>
  </back>
</rfc>
