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<rfc xmlns:xi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XInclude" ipr="trust200902" docName="draft-ietf-lamps-documentsigning-eku-06" number="9336" submissionType="IETF" category="std" consensus="true" tocInclude="true" sortRefs="true" symRefs="true" updates="" obsoletes="" xml:lang="en" version="3">

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  <front>
    <title abbrev="EKU for Document Signing">General Purpose Signing">X.509 Certificate General-Purpose Extended Key Usage (EKU) for Document Signing X.509 Certificates</title> Signing</title>
    <seriesInfo name="Internet-Draft" value="draft-ietf-lamps-documentsigning-eku-06"/> name="RFC" value="9336"/>
    <author initials="T." surname="Ito" fullname="Tadahiko Ito">
      <organization>SECOM CO., LTD.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>tadahiko.ito.public@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="T." surname="Okubo" fullname="Tomofumi Okubo">
      <organization>DigiCert, Inc.</organization>
      <address>
        <email>tomofumi.okubo+ietf@gmail.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <author initials="S." surname="Turner" fullname="Sean Turner">
      <organization>sn3rd</organization>
      <address>
        <email>sean@sn3rd.com</email>
      </address>
    </author>
    <date year="2022" month="September" day="29"/>
    <area>SEC</area>
    <workgroup>LAMPS Working Group</workgroup>
    <keyword>Internet-Draft</keyword> month="December"/>
    <area>sec</area>
    <workgroup>lamps</workgroup>

    <abstract>
      <t>RFC 5280 specifies several extended key purpose identifiers
      (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates. This document defines a general
purpose document signing
      general-purpose Document-Signing KeyPurposeId for inclusion in the
      Extended Key Usage (EKU) extension of X.509 public key certificates.
Document Signing
      Document-Signing applications may require that the EKU extension be
      present and that a document signing Document-Signing KeyPurposeId be indicated in order
      for the certificate to be acceptable to that Document Signing Document-Signing
      application.</t>
    </abstract>
    <note removeInRFC="true">
      <name>About This Document</name>
      <t>
        Status information for this document may be found at <eref target="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-lamps-documentsigning-eku/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>
        Discussion of this document takes place on the
        Limited Additional Mechanisms for PKIX and SMIME (LAMPS) Working Group mailing list (<eref target="mailto:spasm@ietf.org"/>),
        which is archived at <eref target="https://mailarchive.ietf.org/arch/browse/spasm/"/>.
        Subscribe at <eref target="https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/spasm/"/>.
      </t>
      <t>Source for this draft and an issue tracker can be found at
        <eref target="https://github.com/lamps-wg/documentsigning-eku"/>.</t>
    </note>
  </front>
  <middle>
    <section anchor="introduction">
      <name>Introduction</name>

      <t><xref target="RFC5280"/> specifies several extended key purpose
      identifiers (KeyPurposeIds) for X.509 certificates.  In addition, several
KeyPurposeIds have been added under the
      IANA repository "SMI Security for PKIX Extended Key Purpose" <xref target="RFC7299"/>.
      target="RFC7299"/> includes a number of KeyPurposeIds. While usage of
      the
"anyExtendedKeyUsage" anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId is bad practice for publicly
      trusted certificates, there is no public and general KeyPurposeId
      explicitly assigned for Document Signing. The current practice is to use
      id-kp-emailProtection, id-kp-codeSigning id-kp-codeSigning, or a vendor-defined
      KeyPurposeId for general document signing Document-Signing purposes.</t>
      <t>In circumstances where code signing and S/MIME certificates are also
used for document signing, Document Signing, technical or policy changes made to the
code signing and S/MIME ecosystem may cause unexpected behaviors or
have an adverse impact such as decreased cryptographic
agility on the document signing Document-Signing ecosystem and vice versa.</t>

      <t>Vendor-defined KeyPurposeIds that are used in a PKI governed by the
      vendor or a group of vendors poses pose no interoperability concern.
      Appropriating, or misappropriating as the case may be, KeyPurposeIDs for
      use outside of their originally intended vendor or group of vendors
      controlled environment can introduce problems, the impact of which is
      difficult to determine.</t>
      <t>Therefore, it is not favorable to use a vendor-defined KeyPurposeId for
signing a document that is not governed by the vendor.</t>
      <t>This document defines an extended key purpose identifier for Document
Signing.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="conventions-and-definitions">
      <name>Conventions and Definitions</name>
      <t>The
        <t>
    The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL
NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED",
"MAY", "<bcp14>MUST</bcp14>", "<bcp14>MUST NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>REQUIRED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHALL
    NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD</bcp14>", "<bcp14>SHOULD NOT</bcp14>", "<bcp14>RECOMMENDED</bcp14>", "<bcp14>NOT RECOMMENDED</bcp14>",
    "<bcp14>MAY</bcp14>", and "OPTIONAL" "<bcp14>OPTIONAL</bcp14>" in this document are to be interpreted as
    described in BCP 14 BCP&nbsp;14 <xref target="RFC2119"/> <xref target="RFC8174"/>
    when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.</t> here.
        </t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="extended-key-purpose-for-document-signing">
      <name>Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing</name>
      <t>This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning.</t>
      <t>As described in <xref target="RFC5280"/>, "[i]f the [Extended Key Usage] extension is present,
then the certificate MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14> only be used for one of the purposes indicated."
<xref target="RFC5280"/> also describes notes that "[i]f multiple [key] purposes are indicated
the application need not recognize all purposes indicated,
as long as the intended purpose is present."</t>
      <t>Document Signing
      <t>Document-Signing applications MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> require that the Extended Key Usage EKU extension be present
and that the id-kp-documentSigning be indicated in order for the certificate to be acceptable
to that Document Signing Document-Signing application.</t>

<t>The term "Document Signing" in this document refers to digitally signing
contents that are consumed by people.  To be more precise, contents are
intended to be shown to a person with in a printable or displayable form by
means of services or software, rather than primarily processed by
machines.</t> machines.

</t>
      <section anchor="ext">
        <name>Including the Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing in Certificates</name>
        <t><xref target="RFC5280"/> specifies the EKU X.509 certificate extension for use on the
Internet. The extension indicates one or more purposes for which the
certified public key is valid. The EKU extension can be used in
conjunction with the key usage extension, which indicates the set of
basic cryptographic operations for which the certified key may be used.</t>
        <t>The EKU extension syntax is repeated here for convenience:</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[
        <sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
  ExtKeyUsageSyntax  ::=  SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF KeyPurposeId

  KeyPurposeId  ::=  OBJECT IDENTIFIER
]]></artwork>
]]></sourcecode>
        <t>As described in <xref target="RFC5280"/>, the EKU extension may,
at the option of the certificate issuer, be either critical or non-critical.</t>
        <t>This specification defines the KeyPurposeId id-kp-documentSigning.
Inclusion of this KeyPurposeId in a certificate indicates that the
public key encoded in the certificate has been certified to be used for
cryptographic operations on contents that are consumed by people.</t>
        <artwork><![CDATA[

        <sourcecode type=""><![CDATA[
  id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=
      { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
        security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) 3 }

  id-kp-documentSigning  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::=  { id-kp 36 }
]]></artwork>
]]></sourcecode>
      </section>
    </section>
    <section anchor="using-the-extended-key-purpose-for-document-signing-in-a-certificate">
      <name>Using the Extended Key Purpose for Document Signing in a Certificate</name>
      <t>Our intended use case is people consuming the contents of signed
      documents.  To be more precise, contents are intended to be shown to a
      person in a printable or displayable form by means of services or
      software, rather than processed by machines.  The digital
      signature on the contents is to indicate to the recipient of the
      contents that the content has not changed since it was signed by the
      identity indicated as the subject of the certificate. To validate the
      digital signature which that is signed on contents intended to be consumed by
      people, implementations
MAY <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> perform the steps below
      during certificate validation:</t> validation.</t>
      <t>The following procedure is used to examine the KeyPurposeId(s) included in the
Extended Key Usage
EKU extension.
Restrictions on Extended Key Usage EKU is derived and implemented from
(or configured with) the policy to which the implementation conforms.</t>
      <ul spacing="normal">
        <li>If there are no restrictions set for the relying party and the
relying party software, the certificate is acceptable.</li>
        <li>
          <t>If there are restrictions set for the relying party and relying
party software, then process the KeyPurposeId(s) as described below.  </t>
          <t>
This procedure is intended to permit or prohibit the presence of a
certain KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of KeyPurposeIds. It is
outside the scope of this document, but the relying party can permit
or prohibit combinations of KeyPurposeIds, instead of a single
KeyPurposeId.
A consideration on
prohibiting combinations of KeyPurposeIds is described in the
Security Considerations section of this document.
If both "Excluded KeyPurposeId" Excluded KeyPurposeId and "Permitted KeyPurposeId" exists, Permitted KeyPurposeId exist,
the relying party or the relying party software processes each restriction
on "Excluded KeyPurposeId" first, Excluded KeyPurposeId first and then processes each restriction on
"Permitted KeyPurposeId".
Permitted KeyPurposeId.  </t>
          <dl>
<dl newline="true">
            <dt>Excluded KeyPurposeId procedure:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>"Excluded KeyPurposeId"
              <t>Excluded KeyPurposeId is a
KeyPurposeId which that the relying party or the relying party software
prohibits. Examples of "Excluded KeyPurposeId" are, Excluded KeyPurposeId include the presence of the
anyExtendedKeyUsage KeyPurposeId or the complete absence of the EKU
extension in a certificate. If a KeyPurposeId of the certificate
meets the conditions set by the "Excluded KeyPurposeId" Excluded KeyPurposeId restriction,
the relying party or the relying party software rejects the
certificate.</t>
            </dd>
            <dt>Permitted KeyPurposeId procedure:</dt>
            <dd>
              <t>"Permitted KeyPurposeId"

              <t>Permitted KeyPurposeId is a KeyPurposeId which that the relying party or
the relying party software accepts. Examples of "Permitted
KeyPurposeId" are, Permitted
KeyPurposeId include the presence of this general document signing general-purpose Document-Signing
KeyPurposeId and/or protocol specific document signing-type
KeyPurposeIds. the protocol-specific
KeyPurposeIds that are relevant to Document Signing. If a KeyPurposeId of the certificate meets the
condition set by a "Permitted KeyPurposeId" Permitted KeyPurposeId restriction, the
certificate is acceptable. Otherwise, the relying party or the relying
party software rejects the certificate.</t>
            </dd>
          </dl>
        </li>
      </ul>
      <t>When a single application has the capability to process various data
formats, the software may choose to make the excluded and permitted
decisions separately in accordance with the format it is handling (e.g.,
TEXT,
TEXT and PDF).</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="implications-for-a-certification-authority">
      <name>Implications for a Certification Authority</name>
      <t>The procedures and practices employed by a certification authority MUST <bcp14>MUST</bcp14>
ensure that the correct values for the EKU extension are inserted in
each certificate that is issued. Unless certificates are governed by a
vendor(s) specific
vendor-specific PKI, certificates that indicate usage
for document signing MAY Document Signing <bcp14>MAY</bcp14> include the id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId.
The inclusion of the id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId does not
preclude the inclusion of other KeyPurposeIds.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="security-considerations">
      <name>Security Considerations</name>
      <t>The usage of the id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId is to provide an
alternative to id-kp-emailProtection being used for non-email purposes
and id-kp-codeSigning being used to sign objects other than binary code.
This extended key purpose does not introduce new security risks but
instead reduces existing security risks by providing means to separate
other extended key purposes used for communication protocols namely, protocols, which include
TLS (id-kp-clientAuth) or S/MIME (id-kp-emailProtection) etc. and S/&wj;MIME (id-kp-emailProtection),
in order to minimize the risk of cross-protocol attacks.</t>
      <t>To reduce the risk of specific cross-protocol attacks, the relying party
or the relying party software may additionally prohibit use of specific
combinations of KeyPurposeIds.</t>
      <t>While a specific protocol or signing scheme may choose to come up with
their own KeyPurposeIds, some may not have significant motive or
resources to set up and manage their own KeyPurposeIds. This general
document signing general-purpose
Document-Signing KeyPurposeId may be used as a stop-gap for those that
intend to define their own document signing Document-Signing KeyPurposeId or those who do not intend to
set up a KeyPurposeId but still would like to distinguish document
signing Document Signing from other usages.</t>
      <t>Introduction of this id-kp-documentSigning KeyPurposeId does not
introduce any new security or privacy concerns.</t>
    </section>
    <section anchor="iana-considerations">
      <name>IANA Considerations</name>

      <t>IANA made one assignment for has registered the id-kp-
documentSigning object identifier (OID), as defined in Section 3.1, following OID in the "SMI Security for PKIX
      Extended Key Purpose" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3) registry. The other
assignment was made for registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3). This OID is defined in
      <xref target="ext"/>.
</t>

<table anchor="iana_table1">
  <name></name>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Decimal</th>
      <th>Description</th>
      <th>References</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>36</td>
      <td>id-kp-documentSigning</td>
      <td>RFC 9336</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

   <t>IANA has also registered the id-mod-docsign-eku following ASN.1
module <xref
   target="X.680"/> object identifier (OID), as defined in Appendix A, module OID in the "SMI
   Security for PKIX Module Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry.</t> registry (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0). This OID is defined in <xref target="asn1-module"/>.</t>

<table anchor="iana_table2">
  <name></name>
  <thead>
    <tr>
      <th>Decimal</th>
      <th>Description</th>
      <th>References</th>
    </tr>
  </thead>
  <tbody>
    <tr>
      <td>104</td>
      <td>id-mod-docsign-eku</td>
      <td>RFC 9336</td>
    </tr>
  </tbody>
</table>

    </section>
  </middle>
  <back>
    <references>
      <name>References</name>
      <references>
        <name>Normative References</name>

        <reference anchor="X.680">
          <front>
            <title>Information technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation</title>
            <author>
              <organization>ITU-T</organization>
            </author>
            <date year="2015" month="November"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="ISO/IEC" value="8824-1:2015"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC5280">
          <front>
            <title>Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile</title>
            <author fullname="D. Cooper" initials="D." surname="Cooper">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Santesson" initials="S." surname="Santesson">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Farrell" initials="S." surname="Farrell">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="S. Boeyen" initials="S." surname="Boeyen">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <author fullname="W. Polk" initials="W." surname="Polk">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2008"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>This memo profiles the X.509 v3 certificate and X.509 v2 certificate revocation list (CRL) for use in the Internet.  An overview of this approach and model is provided as an introduction.  The X.509 v3 certificate format is described in detail, with additional information regarding the format and semantics of Internet name forms.  Standard certificate extensions are described and two Internet-specific extensions are defined.  A set of required certificate extensions is specified.  The X.509 v2 CRL format is described in detail along with standard and Internet-specific extensions.  An algorithm for X.509 certification path validation is described.  An ASN.1 module and examples are provided in the appendices.  [STANDARDS-TRACK]</t>
            </abstract> year="2021" month="February"/>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="5280"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC5280"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC2119">
          <front>
            <title>Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</title>
            <author fullname="S. Bradner" initials="S." surname="Bradner">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="March" year="1997"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification.  These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents.  This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="2119"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC2119"/>
        </reference>
        <reference anchor="RFC8174">
          <front>
            <title>Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words</title>
            <author fullname="B. Leiba" initials="B." surname="Leiba">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="May" year="2017"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol  specifications.  This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the  defined special meanings.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="BCP" value="14"/>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="8174"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC8174"/> name="ITU-T Recommendation" value="X.680"/>
        </reference>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.5280.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.2119.xml"/>
<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.8174.xml"/>

      </references>
      <references>
        <name>Informative References</name>
        <reference anchor="RFC7299">
          <front>
            <title>Object Identifier Registry for the PKIX Working Group</title>
            <author fullname="R. Housley" initials="R." surname="Housley">
              <organization/>
            </author>
            <date month="July" year="2014"/>
            <abstract>
              <t>When the Public-Key Infrastructure using X.509 (PKIX) Working Group was chartered, an object identifier arc was allocated by IANA for use by that working group.  This document describes the object identifiers that were assigned in that arc, returns control of that arc to IANA, and establishes IANA allocation policies for any future assignments within that arc.</t>
            </abstract>
          </front>
          <seriesInfo name="RFC" value="7299"/>
          <seriesInfo name="DOI" value="10.17487/RFC7299"/>
        </reference>

<xi:include href="https://xml2rfc.ietf.org/public/rfc/bibxml/reference.RFC.7299.xml"/>

      </references>
    </references>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="appendix-a-asn1-module">
      <name>Appendix A. ASN.1 numbered="true" anchor="asn1-module">
      <name>ASN.1 Module</name>
      <t>The following ASN.1 <xref
   target="X.680"/> module provides the complete definition of the
Document Signing
Document-Signing KeyPurposeId.</t>
      <artwork><![CDATA[

      <sourcecode type="asn.1"><![CDATA[
  DocSignEKU { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-docsign-eku(104) }

  DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=

  BEGIN

  -- EXPORTS ALL --

  -- IMPORTS NOTHING --

  -- OID Arc --

  id-kp  OBJECT IDENTIFIER  ::= {
    iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) kp(3) }

  -- Document Signing Document-Signing Extended Key Usage --

  id-kp-documentSigning OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-kp 36 }

  END
]]></artwork>
]]></sourcecode>
    </section>
    <section numbered="false" anchor="acknowledgments">
      <name>Acknowledgments</name>
      <t>We would like to thank Russ Housley <contact fullname="Russ Housley"/> for verifying the ASN.1 module.
Additionally, we would like to thank Corey Bonnell, Wendy Brown, Russ
Housley, Prachi Jain, and Stefan Santesson <contact fullname="Corey Bonnell"/>, <contact fullname="Wendy Brown"/>, <contact fullname="Russ
Housley"/>, <contact fullname="Prachi Jain"/>, and <contact fullname="Stefan Santesson"/> for their comments.</t>
    </section>
  </back>
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