wdiff rfc8213.original rfc8213.txt

Network Working Group
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) B. Volz
Internet-Draft Cisco Systems
Intended status: Standards Track
Request for Comments: 8213 Y. Pal
Expires: October 21, 2017
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems, Inc.
April 19, Systems
ISSN: 2070-1721 August 2017

Security of Messages Exchanged Between between Servers and Relay Agents
draft-ietf-dhc-relay-server-security-05.txt

Abstract

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4) has no
guidance for how to secure messages exchanged between servers and
relay agents. The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6
(DHCPv6) states that IPsec should be used to secure messages
exchanged between servers and relay agents, agents but does not require
encryption. And, with With recent concerns about pervasive monitoring and
other attacks, it is appropriate to require securing relay to relay relay-to-relay
and relay to server relay-to-server communication for DHCPv6 and relay to server relay-to-server
communication for DHCPv4.

Status of This Memo

This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the
provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79.

Internet-Drafts are working documents an Internet Standards Track document.

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This Internet-Draft will expire on October 21, 2017.
http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8213.

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 ....................................................2
2. Requirements Language and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ...........................3
3. Security of Messages Exchanged Between between Servers and Relay
Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 ..........................................................3
4. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 .........................................5
5. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 .............................................5
6. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.1. ......................................................6
6.1. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
7.2. .......................................6
6.2. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 .....................................6
Acknowledgments ....................................................8
Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 .................................................8

1. Introduction

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv4 (DHCPv4) [RFC2131]
and the Bootstrap Protocol [RFC1542] has have no guidance for how to
secure messages exchanged between servers and relay agents. The
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6) [RFC3315]
states that IPsec should be used to secure messages exchanged between
servers and relay agents, agents but does not recommend encryption. And, with With
recent concerns about pervasive monitoring [RFC7258], it is
appropriate to require use of IPsec with encryption for relay to relay-to-
server communication for DHCPv4 and require use of IPsec with
encryption for relay to relay relay-to-relay and relay
to server relay-to-server communication for
DHCPv6.

This document specifies the optional requirements for relay agent and
server implementations to support IPsec authentication and encryption
and recommends that operators enable this IPsec support.

2. Requirements Language and Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP
14 [RFC2119] when [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in ALL CAPS. When these words are not in ALL CAPS (such as
"should" or "Should"), they have their usual English meanings, and
are not to be interpreted all
capitals, as [RFC2119] key words. shown here.

This document uses terminology from [RFC1542], [RFC2131], and
[RFC3315].

3. Security of Messages Exchanged Between between Servers and Relay Agents

For DHCPv6 [RFC3315], this specification REQUIRES relay and server
implementations to support IPsec encryption of relay to relay relay-to-relay and
relay to server
relay-to-server communication as documented below (this below. The remainder of
this section replaces the text in RFC3315 Section 21.1). 21.1 of [RFC3315] when this
specification is followed.

For DHCPv4 [RFC2131], this specification REQUIRES relay and server
implementations to support IPsec encryption of relay to server relay-to-server
communication as documented below.

This specification RECOMMENDS that operators enable IPsec for this
communication.

By using IPsec with encryption for this communication, the potentially
sensitive client message and relay included information, such as the
DHCPv4 relay-agent information Relay Agent Information option (82) [RFC3046], vendor-specific
information (for example, the options defined in [CableLabs-DHCP]),
and Access-Network-Identifier Option(s) option(s) [RFC7839], are protected from
pervasive monitoring and other attacks.

Relay agents and servers MUST be able to exchange messages using the
IPsec mechanisms described in [RFC4301] and with the conditions below.
If a client message is relayed through multiple relay agents (relay
chain), each of the relay agents MUST have an established independent,
pairwise trust relationships. That is, if messages from client C
will be relayed by relay agent A to relay agent B and then to the
server, relay agents A and B MUST be configured to use IPsec for the
messages they exchange, and relay agent B and the server MUST be
configured to use IPsec for the messages they exchange.

Relay agents and servers use IPsec with the following conditions:

Selectors Relay agents are manually configured with the
addresses of the relay agent or server to which DHCP
messages are to be forwarded. Each relay agent and
server that will be using IPsec for securing DHCP
messages MUST also be configured with a list of the
relay agents to which messages will be returned.
The selectors for the relay agents and servers will
be the pairs of addresses defining relay agents and
servers and the direction of DHCP message exchange
on DHCPv4 UDP port 67 or DHCPv6 UDP port 547.

Mode Relay agents and servers MUST use IPsec in transport
mode and use Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).

Encryption and authentication algorithms
This document REQUIRES combined mode algorithms for
ESP authenticated encryption, ESP encryption
algorithms, and ESP authentication algorithms as per
Sections 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of [RFC7321] [RFC7321],
respectively. Encryption is required as relay
agents may forward unencrypted client messages as
well as include additional sensitive information,
such as vendor-specific information (for example,
the options defined in [CableLabs-DHCP]) and the
Access-Network-Identifier Option defined in
[RFC7839].

Key management Because both relay agents and servers tend to be
managed by a single organizational entity, public
key schemes MAY be optional. Manually configured
key management MAY suffice, suffice but does not provide
defense against replayed messages. Accordingly, IKEv2
Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)
[RFC7296] with pre-shared secrets SHOULD be
supported. IKEv2 with public keys MAY be supported.
Additional information on manual vs vs. automated key
management and when one should be used over the
other can be found in [RFC4107].

Security policy DHCP messages between relay agents and servers MUST
only be accepted from DHCP peers as identified in
the local configuration.

Authentication Shared keys, indexed to the source IP address of the
received DHCP message, are adequate in this
application.

Note: As using IPsec with multicast has additional complexities (see
[RFC5374]), relay agents SHOULD be configured to forward DHCP
messages to unicast addresses.

4. Security Considerations

The security model specified in this document is hop-by-hop. hop by hop. For
DHCPv6, there could be multiple relay agents between a client and
server
server, and each of these hops needs to be secured. For DHCPv4,
there is no support for multiple relays.

As this document only mandates securing messages exchanged between
relay agents and servers, the message exchanges between clients and
the first hop first-hop relay agent or server are not secured. Clients may
follow the recommendations in [RFC7844] to minimize what information
they expose or make use of [I-D.ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6] secure DHCPv6 [SEC-DHCPv6] to secure
communication between the client and server.

As mentioned in [RFC4552] Section 14, 14 of [RFC4552], the following are known
limitations of the usage of manual keys:

o As the sequence numbers cannot be negotiated, replay protection
cannot be provided. This leaves DHCP insecure against all the
attacks that can be performed by replaying DHCP packets.

o Manual keys are usually long lived (changing them often is a
tedious task). This gives an attacker enough time to discover the
keys.

It should be noted that if the requirements in this document are
followed, while the DHCP traffic on the wire between relays and
servers is encrypted, the unencrypted data may still be available
through other attacks on the DHCP servers, relays, and related
systems. Securing these systems and the data in databases and logs
also needs to be considered - on both the systems themselves and if when
transferred over a network (i.e., to network attached storage, storage for backups,
backups or to operational support systems).

Use of IPsec as described herein is also applicable to Lightweight
DHCPv6 Relay Agents [RFC6221], as they have a link-local address
which that
can be used to secure communication with their next hop next-hop relay(s).

5. IANA Considerations

This document has makes no requests request of the fantastic IANA team. IANA.

6. Acknowledgments

The motivation for this document was several IESG discusses on recent
DHCP relay agent options.

Thanks to Kim Kinnear, Jinmei Tatuya, Francis Dupont, and Tomek
Mrugalski for reviewing drafts and helping to improve the document.
And, thanks to the authors of [RFC3315] for the original Section 21.1
text.

7. References

7.1.

6.1. Normative References

[RFC1542] Wimer, W., "Clarifications and Extensions for the
Bootstrap Protocol", RFC 1542, DOI 10.17487/RFC1542,
October 1993, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1542>.

[RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119,
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119>.

[RFC2131] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
RFC 2131, DOI 10.17487/RFC2131, March 1997,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2131>.

[RFC3315] Droms, R., Ed., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", RFC 3315, DOI 10.17487/RFC3315, July
2003, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3315>.

[RFC4301] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
Internet Protocol", RFC 4301, DOI 10.17487/RFC4301,
December 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4301>.

[RFC7321] McGrew, D. and P. Hoffman, "Cryptographic Algorithm
Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication
Header (AH)", RFC 7321, DOI 10.17487/RFC7321, August 2014,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7321>.

7.2.

[RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC
2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
May 2017, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174>.

6.2. Informative References

[CableLabs-DHCP]
CableLabs, "CableLabs' DHCP Options Registry",
<http://www.cablelabs.com/specification/
cablelabs-dhcp-options-registry-2/>.

[I-D.ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6]
Li, L., Jiang, S., Cui, Y., Jinmei, T., Lemon, T., and D.
Zhang, "Secure DHCPv6", draft-ietf-dhc-sedhcpv6-21 (work
in progress), February 2017.
<https://apps.cablelabs.com/specification/CL-SP-CANN-DHCP-
Reg>.

[RFC3046] Patrick, M., "DHCP Relay Agent Information Option",
RFC 3046, DOI 10.17487/RFC3046, January 2001,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3046>.

[RFC4107] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
Key Management", BCP 107, RFC 4107, DOI 10.17487/RFC4107,
June 2005, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4107>.

[RFC4552] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, "Authentication/Confidentiality
for OSPFv3", RFC 4552, DOI 10.17487/RFC4552, June 2006,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4552>.

[RFC5374] Weis, B., Gross, G., and D. Ignjatic, "Multicast
Extensions to the Security Architecture for the Internet
Protocol", RFC 5374, DOI 10.17487/RFC5374, November 2008,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5374>.

[RFC6221] Miles, D., Ed., Ooghe, S., Dec, W., Krishnan, S., and A.
Kavanagh, "Lightweight DHCPv6 Relay Agent", RFC 6221,
DOI 10.17487/RFC6221, May 2011,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6221>.

[RFC7258] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
Attack", BCP 188, RFC 7258, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, May
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258>.

[RFC7296] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
(IKEv2)", STD 79, RFC 7296, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
2014, <http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296>.

[RFC7839] Bhandari, S., Gundavelli, S., Grayson, M., Volz, B., and
J. Korhonen, "Access-Network-Identifier Option in DHCP",
RFC 7839, DOI 10.17487/RFC7839, June 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7839>.

[RFC7844] Huitema, C., Mrugalski, T., and S. Krishnan, "Anonymity
Profiles for DHCP Clients", RFC 7844,
DOI 10.17487/RFC7844, May 2016,
<http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7844>.

[SEC-DHCPv6]
Li, L., Jiang, S., Cui, Y., Jinmei, T., Lemon, T., and D.
Zhang, "Secure DHCPv6", Work in Progress, draft-ietf-dhc-
sedhcpv6-21, February 2017.

Acknowledgments

The motivation for this document was several IESG DISCUSSes on recent
DHCP relay agent options.

Thanks to Kim Kinnear, Jinmei Tatuya, Francis Dupont, and Tomek
Mrugalski for reviewing and helping to improve the document. Thanks
to the authors of [RFC3315] for the original Section 21.1 text.

Authors' Addresses

Bernie Volz
Cisco Systems, Inc.
1414 Massachusetts Ave
Boxborough, MA 01719
USA
United States of America

Email: volz@cisco.com

Yogendra Pal
Cisco Systems, Inc. Systems
Cessna Business Park, Park
Varthur Hobli, Outer Ring Road, Road
Bangalore, Karnataka 560103
India

Email: yogpal@cisco.com